2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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package handler
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import (
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2026-05-13 15:07:18 +00:00
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"context"
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2026-04-11 04:47:17 +00:00
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"crypto/rand"
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2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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2026-04-11 04:47:17 +00:00
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"fmt"
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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2025-12-03 03:11:57 +00:00
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/config"
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/errors"
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2026-07-02 04:31:57 +00:00
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/handler/dto"
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/logger"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types/interfaces"
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2025-11-25 16:57:33 +00:00
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secutils "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/utils"
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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)
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2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
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const oidcNonceCookieName = "weknora_oidc_nonce"
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const oidcNonceCookieMaxAge = 600
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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// AuthHandler implements HTTP request handlers for user authentication
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// Provides functionality for user registration, login, logout, and token management
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// through the REST API endpoints
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type AuthHandler struct {
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2026-05-24 13:38:05 +00:00
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userService interfaces.UserService
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tenantService interfaces.TenantService
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configInfo *config.Config
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systemSettingSvc interfaces.SystemSettingService
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feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode (#1504)
* feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode
When the auth.registration_mode toggle flips to invite_only, the public
/auth/register endpoint returns 403 — but until now there was no
channel for unregistered users to actually join a tenant. The existing
invitation table required a registered invitee, so new emails could
not enter the system at all.
This change introduces a share-link model:
- Owner generates a multi-use registration link with a per-tenant role
- Recipient opens the link, registers with their own email, and is
added to the tenant on the same request
- Token is stored in plaintext (not hashed) so the management UI can
re-display the URL on demand without a "copy now or revoke" trap.
Threat model is bounded by 7-day TTL, revocability, and the fact
that all the link grants is membership in one tenant.
- accepted_count tracks how many users joined through the link so the
Owner can tell whether a link is fresh or has already been spread
Per-user invitations (registered email -> in-app inbox accept) are
unchanged. Share-link rows use empty invitee_user_id as discriminator;
the partial unique index on (tenant_id, invitee_user_id) was relaxed
to skip empty values so multiple share links can coexist per tenant.
Frontend reuses Login.vue for /register?token=xxx instead of a
parallel page, and adds icon-only revoke / remove actions plus a
distinct "active" status tag for share-link rows.
Migration 000054 adds the token column, the accepted_count column,
and the relaxed pending unique index in a single step.
* feat(auth): update invitation token handling and add rate limiting
- Refactor the invitation token retrieval to use POST instead of GET, enhancing security by preventing the plaintext token from appearing in logs and browser history.
- Update the API endpoint from `/auth/invitations/:token` to `/auth/invitations/lookup` to reflect the new method.
- Introduce a rate limiter for unauthenticated share-link endpoints to mitigate brute-force attacks and abuse, ensuring a maximum of 30 requests per minute per IP.
- Adjust the registration flow to maintain user experience while securing the invitation process.
2026-05-27 11:42:01 +00:00
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// invitationSvc is required for the share-link registration path
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// (POST /auth/register-by-invite). When nil — e.g. legacy test
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// fixtures — the share-link endpoints respond 503 rather than
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// blocking the rest of the auth surface.
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invitationSvc interfaces.TenantInvitationService
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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}
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2025-09-16 07:39:34 +00:00
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// NewAuthHandler creates a new auth handler instance with the provided services
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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// Parameters:
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// - userService: An implementation of the UserService interface for business logic
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2025-09-16 07:39:34 +00:00
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// - tenantService: An implementation of the TenantService interface for tenant management
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2026-05-24 13:38:05 +00:00
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// - systemSettingSvc: 3-tier resolver for runtime-tunable settings such as
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// auth.registration_mode (P3). When DB has a row, it overrides cfg's
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// startup value; otherwise we fall back to cfg.Auth.RegistrationMode
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// (which already accounted for the legacy DISABLE_REGISTRATION env coerce
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// during config load). Mismatch impossible by construction since the
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// handler always passes cfg's value as the def parameter to GetString.
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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//
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// Returns a pointer to the newly created AuthHandler
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2025-12-03 03:11:57 +00:00
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func NewAuthHandler(configInfo *config.Config,
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2026-05-24 13:38:05 +00:00
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userService interfaces.UserService, tenantService interfaces.TenantService,
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systemSettingSvc interfaces.SystemSettingService,
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feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode (#1504)
* feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode
When the auth.registration_mode toggle flips to invite_only, the public
/auth/register endpoint returns 403 — but until now there was no
channel for unregistered users to actually join a tenant. The existing
invitation table required a registered invitee, so new emails could
not enter the system at all.
This change introduces a share-link model:
- Owner generates a multi-use registration link with a per-tenant role
- Recipient opens the link, registers with their own email, and is
added to the tenant on the same request
- Token is stored in plaintext (not hashed) so the management UI can
re-display the URL on demand without a "copy now or revoke" trap.
Threat model is bounded by 7-day TTL, revocability, and the fact
that all the link grants is membership in one tenant.
- accepted_count tracks how many users joined through the link so the
Owner can tell whether a link is fresh or has already been spread
Per-user invitations (registered email -> in-app inbox accept) are
unchanged. Share-link rows use empty invitee_user_id as discriminator;
the partial unique index on (tenant_id, invitee_user_id) was relaxed
to skip empty values so multiple share links can coexist per tenant.
Frontend reuses Login.vue for /register?token=xxx instead of a
parallel page, and adds icon-only revoke / remove actions plus a
distinct "active" status tag for share-link rows.
Migration 000054 adds the token column, the accepted_count column,
and the relaxed pending unique index in a single step.
* feat(auth): update invitation token handling and add rate limiting
- Refactor the invitation token retrieval to use POST instead of GET, enhancing security by preventing the plaintext token from appearing in logs and browser history.
- Update the API endpoint from `/auth/invitations/:token` to `/auth/invitations/lookup` to reflect the new method.
- Introduce a rate limiter for unauthenticated share-link endpoints to mitigate brute-force attacks and abuse, ensuring a maximum of 30 requests per minute per IP.
- Adjust the registration flow to maintain user experience while securing the invitation process.
2026-05-27 11:42:01 +00:00
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invitationSvc interfaces.TenantInvitationService,
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2026-05-24 13:38:05 +00:00
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) *AuthHandler {
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2026-05-13 15:07:18 +00:00
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// Boot-time guard: a nil-or-empty Auth section silently disables the
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// invite_only gate (see Register below). Emit a loud one-shot log
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// pointing at the misconfiguration so operators notice on startup
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// instead of discovering it the day someone hits /auth/register.
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if configInfo == nil || configInfo.Auth == nil {
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logger.Errorf(context.Background(),
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"[auth] AuthHandler constructed with nil/incomplete config (cfg=%v); "+
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"registration_mode enforcement is disabled. This is almost certainly a wiring bug.",
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configInfo)
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}
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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return &AuthHandler{
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2026-05-24 13:38:05 +00:00
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configInfo: configInfo,
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userService: userService,
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tenantService: tenantService,
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systemSettingSvc: systemSettingSvc,
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feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode (#1504)
* feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode
When the auth.registration_mode toggle flips to invite_only, the public
/auth/register endpoint returns 403 — but until now there was no
channel for unregistered users to actually join a tenant. The existing
invitation table required a registered invitee, so new emails could
not enter the system at all.
This change introduces a share-link model:
- Owner generates a multi-use registration link with a per-tenant role
- Recipient opens the link, registers with their own email, and is
added to the tenant on the same request
- Token is stored in plaintext (not hashed) so the management UI can
re-display the URL on demand without a "copy now or revoke" trap.
Threat model is bounded by 7-day TTL, revocability, and the fact
that all the link grants is membership in one tenant.
- accepted_count tracks how many users joined through the link so the
Owner can tell whether a link is fresh or has already been spread
Per-user invitations (registered email -> in-app inbox accept) are
unchanged. Share-link rows use empty invitee_user_id as discriminator;
the partial unique index on (tenant_id, invitee_user_id) was relaxed
to skip empty values so multiple share links can coexist per tenant.
Frontend reuses Login.vue for /register?token=xxx instead of a
parallel page, and adds icon-only revoke / remove actions plus a
distinct "active" status tag for share-link rows.
Migration 000054 adds the token column, the accepted_count column,
and the relaxed pending unique index in a single step.
* feat(auth): update invitation token handling and add rate limiting
- Refactor the invitation token retrieval to use POST instead of GET, enhancing security by preventing the plaintext token from appearing in logs and browser history.
- Update the API endpoint from `/auth/invitations/:token` to `/auth/invitations/lookup` to reflect the new method.
- Introduce a rate limiter for unauthenticated share-link endpoints to mitigate brute-force attacks and abuse, ensuring a maximum of 30 requests per minute per IP.
- Adjust the registration flow to maintain user experience while securing the invitation process.
2026-05-27 11:42:01 +00:00
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invitationSvc: invitationSvc,
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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}
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}
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2026-05-24 13:38:05 +00:00
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// resolveRegistrationMode returns the currently active registration mode.
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// Priority: DB system_settings > cfg (which already absorbed the legacy
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// DISABLE_REGISTRATION env coerce at startup) > "self_serve" hard default.
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//
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// Centralised here so /auth/register and /auth/config stay in lock-step —
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// otherwise a SystemAdmin's UI edit could affect one path and not the other.
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func (h *AuthHandler) resolveRegistrationMode(ctx context.Context) string {
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// cfg-derived default: empty is impossible after applyAuthAndTenantDefaults,
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// but be defensive in case AuthHandler was constructed before that ran
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// (the NewAuthHandler guard already logged in that case).
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def := config.AuthRegistrationModeSelfServe
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if h.configInfo != nil && h.configInfo.Auth != nil {
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if m := strings.TrimSpace(h.configInfo.Auth.RegistrationMode); m != "" {
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def = m
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}
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}
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if h.systemSettingSvc == nil {
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return def
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}
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// envName = "" because DISABLE_REGISTRATION is a boolean and
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// auth.registration_mode is a string — the legacy env was already
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// coerced into `def` above. Mixing the two semantics at the resolver
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// layer would mean a UI delete (DB row absent) silently flipped to
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// the legacy boolean read again, which is surprising.
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return h.systemSettingSvc.GetString(ctx, "auth.registration_mode", "", def)
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}
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2026-07-13 10:04:14 +00:00
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// resolveDefaultTenantMode returns the provisioning policy for ordinary
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// public password registrations. Invitation registration never uses this
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// value: the invitation itself supplies the target tenant.
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func (h *AuthHandler) resolveDefaultTenantMode(ctx context.Context) types.TenantProvisioningMode {
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def := config.AuthDefaultTenantModeCreatePersonal
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if h.configInfo != nil && h.configInfo.Auth != nil {
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if mode := strings.TrimSpace(h.configInfo.Auth.DefaultTenantMode); mode != "" {
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def = mode
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}
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}
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mode := def
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if h.systemSettingSvc != nil {
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mode = h.systemSettingSvc.GetString(
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ctx,
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"auth.default_tenant_mode",
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"WEKNORA_AUTH_DEFAULT_TENANT_MODE",
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def,
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)
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}
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if mode == config.AuthDefaultTenantModeTenantless {
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return types.TenantProvisioningTenantless
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}
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return types.TenantProvisioningCreatePersonal
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}
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2025-12-16 08:40:13 +00:00
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// Register godoc
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// @Summary 用户注册
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// @Description 注册新用户账号
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// @Tags 认证
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// @Accept json
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// @Produce json
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// @Param request body types.RegisterRequest true "注册请求参数"
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// @Success 201 {object} types.RegisterResponse
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// @Failure 400 {object} errors.AppError "请求参数错误"
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2025-12-22 06:41:11 +00:00
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// @Failure 403 {object} errors.AppError "注册功能已禁用"
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2025-12-16 08:40:13 +00:00
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// @Router /auth/register [post]
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2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
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func (h *AuthHandler) Register(c *gin.Context) {
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ctx := c.Request.Context()
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logger.Info(ctx, "Start user registration")
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feat(rbac): tenant member management + invite_only gate (PR 3 of 3, #1303)
Wire the human-facing surface for the tenant-RBAC system that PR 1
introduced and PR 2 enforced: REST endpoints + UI for managing tenant
members, plus the long-pending invite_only registration gate.
Backend
- internal/handler/auth.go: Register now rejects with 403 when
auth.registration_mode=invite_only. PR 1 already exposes the mode via
/auth/config so the frontend hides the sign-up link; this is the
server-side enforcement for direct API calls.
- internal/handler/tenant_member.go: new TenantMemberHandler with
ListMembers / AddMember / UpdateMemberRole / RemoveMember. Maps
service-layer sentinels onto HTTP semantics (ErrLastOwner -> 409,
ErrMembershipAlreadyExists -> 409, ErrUserNotFound on AddMember -> 404,
ErrInvalidTenantRole -> 400). AddMember requires the invitee to
already have an account; SMTP-driven email invites are deferred.
- internal/types/tenant_member.go: new TenantMemberResponse projection
carrying the fields the management UI renders (email, username,
avatar, role, joined_at).
- internal/router/router.go: four routes under /tenants/:id/members
gated per the matrix (Viewer+ for list, Owner+ for every mutation).
- internal/container/container.go: dig provider for the new handler.
Tests
- handler/tenant_member_test.go: 12 table-driven cases covering happy
path, dangling-user tolerance, ErrLastOwner -> 409, ErrMembershipNotFound
-> 404, ErrMembershipAlreadyExists -> 409, unknown email -> 404,
invalid role rejected before user lookup, bad tenant id -> 400.
- handler/auth_register_invite_only_test.go: invite_only -> 403,
self_serve -> 201, nil Auth config falls through.
Frontend
- src/api/tenant/members.ts: typed client (TenantRole/TenantMember/...)
for the four endpoints.
- src/views/settings/TenantMembers.vue: members table with add dialog,
inline role select, confirm-remove modal. All mutation widgets gated
behind currentTenantRole === 'owner'; server still enforces.
- src/views/settings/Settings.vue: register the Members tab; show only
when currentTenantRole is loaded (avoids tab flash on cold nav).
- i18n in en-US/zh-CN/ko-KR/ru-RU: new tenantMember namespace covering
all UI strings and structured error messages (lastOwner / userNotFound
/ alreadyMember / invalidRole etc).
This completes the #1303 RBAC rollout. With cfg.Tenant.EnableRBAC=true
operators now have a full management surface; with EnableRBAC=false
the routes still exist but mutations log-and-pass per PR 2 contract.
2026-05-13 14:23:59 +00:00
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// 当 auth.registration_mode=invite_only 时,public 注册被关闭。
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2026-05-24 13:38:05 +00:00
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// 优先级:DB system_settings > cfg.Auth.RegistrationMode > "self_serve"。
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// SystemAdmin 通过「全局设置」UI 实时切换 self_serve / invite_only,立即
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// 生效,不需要重启服务。历史变量 DISABLE_REGISTRATION=true 仍在 config
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// 启动阶段被等价提升为 invite_only(applyAuthAndTenantDefaults),
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// 作为 cfg-default 进入 resolveRegistrationMode。
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if h.resolveRegistrationMode(ctx) == config.AuthRegistrationModeInviteOnly {
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feat(rbac): tenant member management + invite_only gate (PR 3 of 3, #1303)
Wire the human-facing surface for the tenant-RBAC system that PR 1
introduced and PR 2 enforced: REST endpoints + UI for managing tenant
members, plus the long-pending invite_only registration gate.
Backend
- internal/handler/auth.go: Register now rejects with 403 when
auth.registration_mode=invite_only. PR 1 already exposes the mode via
/auth/config so the frontend hides the sign-up link; this is the
server-side enforcement for direct API calls.
- internal/handler/tenant_member.go: new TenantMemberHandler with
ListMembers / AddMember / UpdateMemberRole / RemoveMember. Maps
service-layer sentinels onto HTTP semantics (ErrLastOwner -> 409,
ErrMembershipAlreadyExists -> 409, ErrUserNotFound on AddMember -> 404,
ErrInvalidTenantRole -> 400). AddMember requires the invitee to
already have an account; SMTP-driven email invites are deferred.
- internal/types/tenant_member.go: new TenantMemberResponse projection
carrying the fields the management UI renders (email, username,
avatar, role, joined_at).
- internal/router/router.go: four routes under /tenants/:id/members
gated per the matrix (Viewer+ for list, Owner+ for every mutation).
- internal/container/container.go: dig provider for the new handler.
Tests
- handler/tenant_member_test.go: 12 table-driven cases covering happy
path, dangling-user tolerance, ErrLastOwner -> 409, ErrMembershipNotFound
-> 404, ErrMembershipAlreadyExists -> 409, unknown email -> 404,
invalid role rejected before user lookup, bad tenant id -> 400.
- handler/auth_register_invite_only_test.go: invite_only -> 403,
self_serve -> 201, nil Auth config falls through.
Frontend
- src/api/tenant/members.ts: typed client (TenantRole/TenantMember/...)
for the four endpoints.
- src/views/settings/TenantMembers.vue: members table with add dialog,
inline role select, confirm-remove modal. All mutation widgets gated
behind currentTenantRole === 'owner'; server still enforces.
- src/views/settings/Settings.vue: register the Members tab; show only
when currentTenantRole is loaded (avoids tab flash on cold nav).
- i18n in en-US/zh-CN/ko-KR/ru-RU: new tenantMember namespace covering
all UI strings and structured error messages (lastOwner / userNotFound
/ alreadyMember / invalidRole etc).
This completes the #1303 RBAC rollout. With cfg.Tenant.EnableRBAC=true
operators now have a full management surface; with EnableRBAC=false
the routes still exist but mutations log-and-pass per PR 2 contract.
2026-05-13 14:23:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
logger.Warn(ctx, "Registration rejected: auth.registration_mode=invite_only")
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewForbiddenError("Registration is invite-only")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
var req types.RegisterRequest
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Failed to parse registration request parameters", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Invalid registration parameters").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-11-26 02:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
req.Username = secutils.SanitizeForLog(req.Username)
|
|
|
|
|
|
req.Email = secutils.SanitizeForLog(req.Email)
|
|
|
|
|
|
req.Password = secutils.SanitizeForLog(req.Password)
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Validate required fields
|
|
|
|
|
|
if req.Username == "" || req.Email == "" || req.Password == "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Missing required registration fields")
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Username, email and password are required")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-11-25 16:57:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
req.Username = secutils.SanitizeForLog(req.Username)
|
|
|
|
|
|
req.Email = secutils.SanitizeForLog(req.Email)
|
2026-07-13 10:04:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
req.TenantProvisioning = h.resolveDefaultTenantMode(ctx)
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// Call service to register user
|
|
|
|
|
|
user, err := h.userService.Register(ctx, &req)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to register user: %v", err)
|
2026-03-15 03:09:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewBadRequestError(err.Error())
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Return success response
|
|
|
|
|
|
response := &types.RegisterResponse{
|
|
|
|
|
|
Success: true,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Message: "Registration successful",
|
|
|
|
|
|
User: user,
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-26 02:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
logger.Infof(ctx, "User registered successfully: %s", secutils.SanitizeForLog(user.Email))
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, response)
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-12-16 08:40:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// Login godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 用户登录
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 用户登录并获取访问令牌
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Param request body types.LoginRequest true "登录请求参数"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} types.LoginResponse
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 401 {object} errors.AppError "认证失败"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/login [post]
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Info(ctx, "Start user login")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var req types.LoginRequest
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Failed to parse login request parameters", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Invalid login parameters").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-11-26 03:27:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
email := secutils.SanitizeForLog(req.Email)
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Validate required fields
|
|
|
|
|
|
if req.Email == "" || req.Password == "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Missing required login fields")
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Email and password are required")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Call service to authenticate user
|
|
|
|
|
|
response, err := h.userService.Login(ctx, &req)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to login user: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewUnauthorizedError("Login failed").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check if login was successful
|
|
|
|
|
|
if !response.Success {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Warnf(ctx, "Login failed: %s", response.Message)
|
2026-07-02 04:34:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, dto.NewAuthLoginResponse(response))
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// User is already in the correct format from service
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-26 03:27:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
logger.Infof(ctx, "User logged in successfully, email: %s", email)
|
2026-07-02 04:34:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, dto.NewAuthLoginResponse(response))
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// GetOIDCAuthorizationURL godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 获取OIDC授权地址
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 根据后端OIDC配置生成第三方登录跳转地址
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Param redirect_uri query string true "OIDC回调地址"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} types.OIDCAuthURLResponse
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 400 {object} errors.AppError "请求参数错误"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 403 {object} errors.AppError "OIDC未启用"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/oidc/url [get]
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) GetOIDCAuthorizationURL(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
redirectURI := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("redirect_uri"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
if redirectURI == "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("redirect_uri is required")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resp, err := h.userService.GetOIDCAuthorizationURL(ctx, redirectURI)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to generate OIDC authorization URL: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewForbiddenError("OIDC authorization unavailable").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// Bind the state nonce to this browser so an attacker cannot replay
|
|
|
|
|
|
// their own authorization code into a victim's callback.
|
|
|
|
|
|
if resp.Nonce != "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
secure := c.Request.TLS != nil || strings.EqualFold(c.GetHeader("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.SetCookie(oidcNonceCookieName, resp.Nonce, oidcNonceCookieMaxAge, "/", "", secure, true)
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// GetOIDCConfig godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 获取OIDC登录配置
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 返回OIDC是否启用以及provider展示名称,供前端决定是否展示OIDC登录入口
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} types.OIDCConfigResponse
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/oidc/config [get]
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) GetOIDCConfig(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
providerDisplayName := ""
|
|
|
|
|
|
enabled := false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if h.configInfo != nil && h.configInfo.OIDCAuth != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
enabled = h.configInfo.OIDCAuth.Enable
|
|
|
|
|
|
providerDisplayName = strings.TrimSpace(h.configInfo.OIDCAuth.ProviderDisplayName)
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, &types.OIDCConfigResponse{
|
|
|
|
|
|
Success: true,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Enabled: enabled,
|
|
|
|
|
|
ProviderDisplayName: providerDisplayName,
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// OIDCRedirectCallback godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary OIDC登录重定向回调
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 接收OIDC provider回调并由后端完成code交换,随后重定向回前端登录页
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Param code query string false "OIDC授权码"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Param state query string false "OIDC状态"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Param error query string false "OIDC错误码"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 302
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/oidc/callback [get]
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) OIDCRedirectCallback(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
frontendRedirectURI := "/"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if providerError := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("error")); providerError != "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
redirectURL := frontendRedirectURI + "#oidc_error=" + urlQueryEscape(providerError)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if description := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("error_description")); description != "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
redirectURL += "&oidc_error_description=" + urlQueryEscape(description)
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, redirectURL)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
state := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("state"))
|
2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
decodedState, err := decodeOIDCState(state, c.Request)
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to decode OIDC state: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendRedirectURI+"#oidc_error="+urlQueryEscape("invalid_state"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// One-time use: clear the binding cookie as soon as it is checked.
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.SetCookie(oidcNonceCookieName, "", -1, "/", "", false, true)
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
code := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("code"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
if code == "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendRedirectURI+"#oidc_error="+urlQueryEscape("missing_code"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-07-13 10:26:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
resp, err := h.userService.LoginWithOIDC(ctx, code, strings.TrimSpace(decodedState.RedirectURI), h.resolveDefaultTenantMode(ctx))
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to complete OIDC login via redirect callback: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendRedirectURI+"#oidc_error="+urlQueryEscape("login_failed")+"&oidc_error_description="+urlQueryEscape(err.Error()))
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if !resp.Success {
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendRedirectURI+"#oidc_error="+urlQueryEscape("login_failed")+"&oidc_error_description="+urlQueryEscape(resp.Message))
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
payload, err := encodeOIDCCallbackPayload(resp)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to encode OIDC callback payload: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendRedirectURI+"#oidc_error="+urlQueryEscape("payload_encode_failed"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendRedirectURI+"#oidc_result="+urlQueryEscape(payload))
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func encodeOIDCCallbackPayload(resp *types.OIDCCallbackResponse) (string, error) {
|
2026-07-02 04:34:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
payload, err := json.Marshal(dto.NewAuthOIDCCallbackResponse(resp))
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
return "", err
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payload), nil
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
type oidcStatePayload struct {
|
2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Nonce string
|
|
|
|
|
|
RedirectURI string
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
func decodeOIDCState(raw string, req *http.Request) (*oidcStatePayload, error) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
payload, err := secutils.VerifyOIDCState(raw)
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
cookieNonce, err := req.Cookie(oidcNonceCookieName)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil || cookieNonce == nil || strings.TrimSpace(cookieNonce.Value) == "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
return nil, errors.NewValidationError("oidc nonce cookie missing")
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if cookieNonce.Value != payload.Nonce {
|
|
|
|
|
|
return nil, errors.NewValidationError("oidc nonce mismatch")
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return &oidcStatePayload{
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nonce: payload.Nonce,
|
|
|
|
|
|
RedirectURI: strings.TrimSpace(payload.RedirectURI),
|
|
|
|
|
|
}, nil
|
2026-03-30 03:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func urlQueryEscape(value string) string {
|
|
|
|
|
|
replacer := strings.NewReplacer(
|
|
|
|
|
|
"%", "%25",
|
|
|
|
|
|
" ", "%20",
|
|
|
|
|
|
"#", "%23",
|
|
|
|
|
|
"&", "%26",
|
|
|
|
|
|
"+", "%2B",
|
|
|
|
|
|
"=", "%3D",
|
|
|
|
|
|
"?", "%3F",
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return replacer.Replace(value)
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-12-16 08:40:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// Logout godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 用户登出
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 撤销当前访问令牌并登出
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]interface{} "登出成功"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 400 {object} errors.AppError "请求参数错误"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Security Bearer
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/logout [post]
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) Logout(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Info(ctx, "Start user logout")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Extract token from Authorization header
|
|
|
|
|
|
authHeader := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
|
|
|
|
|
|
if authHeader == "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Missing Authorization header")
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Authorization header is required")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Parse Bearer token
|
|
|
|
|
|
tokenParts := strings.Split(authHeader, " ")
|
|
|
|
|
|
if len(tokenParts) != 2 || tokenParts[0] != "Bearer" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Invalid Authorization header format")
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Invalid Authorization header format")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
token := tokenParts[1]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-07-02 07:26:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// Revoke every outstanding session for this user so refresh tokens
|
|
|
|
|
|
// cannot keep working after logout.
|
|
|
|
|
|
err := h.userService.Logout(ctx, token)
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to revoke token: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewInternalServerError("Logout failed").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Info(ctx, "User logged out successfully")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
|
|
|
|
|
|
"success": true,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"message": "Logout successful",
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-12-16 08:40:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// RefreshToken godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 刷新令牌
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 使用刷新令牌获取新的访问令牌
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Param request body object{refreshToken=string} true "刷新令牌"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]interface{} "新令牌"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 401 {object} errors.AppError "令牌无效"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/refresh [post]
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) RefreshToken(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Info(ctx, "Start token refresh")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var req struct {
|
|
|
|
|
|
RefreshToken string `json:"refreshToken" binding:"required"`
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Failed to parse refresh token request", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Invalid refresh token request").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Call service to refresh token
|
|
|
|
|
|
accessToken, newRefreshToken, err := h.userService.RefreshToken(ctx, req.RefreshToken)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to refresh token: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewUnauthorizedError("Token refresh failed").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Info(ctx, "Token refreshed successfully")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
|
|
|
|
|
|
"success": true,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"message": "Token refreshed successfully",
|
|
|
|
|
|
"access_token": accessToken,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"refresh_token": newRefreshToken,
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-12-16 08:40:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// GetCurrentUser godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 获取当前用户信息
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 获取当前登录用户的详细信息
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]interface{} "用户信息"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 401 {object} errors.AppError "未授权"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Security Bearer
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/me [get]
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) GetCurrentUser(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Get current user from service (which extracts from context)
|
|
|
|
|
|
user, err := h.userService.GetCurrentUser(ctx)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to get current user: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewUnauthorizedError("Failed to get user information").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(rbac): role-aware UI gates leaked write affordances after tenant switch
When an Owner of tenant A invited user B as a Viewer, B could log in,
switch the active tenant from B's home to A via the user menu, and
still see every write button — Create KB, Upload Document, Edit/Delete
agent — because the role-gate plumbing on the client was wired to the
wrong tenant. The server's RBAC enforcement (PR 2 / PR 5) still blocked
the actual mutations with 403, so no data leaked, but the UI presented
authority the user did not have, which is a confusing and embarrassing
defect.
Five distinct root causes, all on the client / server boundary:
1. `currentTenantRole` (frontend/src/stores/auth.ts) read
`tenant.value.id` — the user's *home* tenant — instead of the active
tenant id. After switching to A, the helper still returned B's home
role (Owner), so every `hasRole(...)` gate in the codebase silently
short-circuited. Fix: read `selectedTenantId` first, fall back to
`tenant.id`.
2. `setMemberships` was only called once, on /auth/login. Hard reloads
(which the tenant switcher triggers) re-ran `getCurrentUser()` via
`App.vue` and `router/index.ts`, but those callers discarded the
`memberships` field of the response, so the auth store kept the
login-time snapshot forever. Role changes between sessions stayed
invisible. Fix: extract memberships in both /auth/me consumers and
feed them into `setMemberships`.
3. `KnowledgeBase.vue`'s `isOwner` compared `kb.tenant_id` to the
active tenant id, so any KB inside the current tenant was treated
as "owned by the caller" — bypassing every role gate below. Fix:
compare against `kb.creator_id` (the field PR 5 introduced) and
require an actual creator match. `canEdit` / `canManage` now layer
`hasRole('admin')` on top so a non-creator with sufficient role can
still manage.
4. `KnowledgeBaseList.vue` and `AgentList.vue` rendered the per-card
more-menu (Settings, Delete, Edit) unconditionally. With the
ownership column from PR 5 this is straightforward to gate on the
client: Settings/Delete now require creator-match or `hasRole('admin')`
per the server's `OwnedKBOrAdmin` / `OwnedAgentOrAdmin` matrix.
5. The axios interceptor (frontend/src/utils/request.ts) had a
"selectedTenantId === defaultTenantId → don't attach X-Tenant-ID"
short-circuit. Any code that wrote the active tenant into
`weknora_tenant` (UserMenu's loadUserInfo, OIDC sync, router
hydrate) made the two values equal, after which the header silently
stopped attaching and subsequent navigation requests landed on the
home tenant. Fix: drop the short-circuit; always attach when
selectedTenantId is set.
Server-side, /auth/me read `user.TenantID` (the immutable home tenant
id stamped at signup) when fetching the tenant for the response, so
the `tenant` field always pointed at home even after the auth
middleware had already resolved an active tenant from X-Tenant-ID.
The frontend then re-keyed `authStore.tenant` to the home tenant on
every refresh, undoing the switch. Fix: read the active tenant id from
context (`types.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)`) and only fall back to
user.TenantID when context is unset.
The server-side enforcement was correct throughout — every fix here is
purely about not lying to the user with the rendered UI.
2026-05-14 13:55:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// Get tenant information for the *active* tenant (the one the
|
|
|
|
|
|
// auth middleware resolved against the X-Tenant-ID header), not
|
|
|
|
|
|
// the user's home tenant. user.TenantID is the row stored on the
|
|
|
|
|
|
// users table at signup time and never changes; reading it here
|
|
|
|
|
|
// would make /auth/me always return the home tenant even after
|
|
|
|
|
|
// the user switched into a peer tenant. The frontend then re-keys
|
|
|
|
|
|
// `authStore.tenant.id` to the home tenant, and every UI gate
|
|
|
|
|
|
// computed against it (currentTenantRole, isOwner, ...) leaks
|
|
|
|
|
|
// the wrong role. Pull the active tenant id from context instead.
|
2025-09-16 07:39:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
var tenant *types.Tenant
|
fix(rbac): role-aware UI gates leaked write affordances after tenant switch
When an Owner of tenant A invited user B as a Viewer, B could log in,
switch the active tenant from B's home to A via the user menu, and
still see every write button — Create KB, Upload Document, Edit/Delete
agent — because the role-gate plumbing on the client was wired to the
wrong tenant. The server's RBAC enforcement (PR 2 / PR 5) still blocked
the actual mutations with 403, so no data leaked, but the UI presented
authority the user did not have, which is a confusing and embarrassing
defect.
Five distinct root causes, all on the client / server boundary:
1. `currentTenantRole` (frontend/src/stores/auth.ts) read
`tenant.value.id` — the user's *home* tenant — instead of the active
tenant id. After switching to A, the helper still returned B's home
role (Owner), so every `hasRole(...)` gate in the codebase silently
short-circuited. Fix: read `selectedTenantId` first, fall back to
`tenant.id`.
2. `setMemberships` was only called once, on /auth/login. Hard reloads
(which the tenant switcher triggers) re-ran `getCurrentUser()` via
`App.vue` and `router/index.ts`, but those callers discarded the
`memberships` field of the response, so the auth store kept the
login-time snapshot forever. Role changes between sessions stayed
invisible. Fix: extract memberships in both /auth/me consumers and
feed them into `setMemberships`.
3. `KnowledgeBase.vue`'s `isOwner` compared `kb.tenant_id` to the
active tenant id, so any KB inside the current tenant was treated
as "owned by the caller" — bypassing every role gate below. Fix:
compare against `kb.creator_id` (the field PR 5 introduced) and
require an actual creator match. `canEdit` / `canManage` now layer
`hasRole('admin')` on top so a non-creator with sufficient role can
still manage.
4. `KnowledgeBaseList.vue` and `AgentList.vue` rendered the per-card
more-menu (Settings, Delete, Edit) unconditionally. With the
ownership column from PR 5 this is straightforward to gate on the
client: Settings/Delete now require creator-match or `hasRole('admin')`
per the server's `OwnedKBOrAdmin` / `OwnedAgentOrAdmin` matrix.
5. The axios interceptor (frontend/src/utils/request.ts) had a
"selectedTenantId === defaultTenantId → don't attach X-Tenant-ID"
short-circuit. Any code that wrote the active tenant into
`weknora_tenant` (UserMenu's loadUserInfo, OIDC sync, router
hydrate) made the two values equal, after which the header silently
stopped attaching and subsequent navigation requests landed on the
home tenant. Fix: drop the short-circuit; always attach when
selectedTenantId is set.
Server-side, /auth/me read `user.TenantID` (the immutable home tenant
id stamped at signup) when fetching the tenant for the response, so
the `tenant` field always pointed at home even after the auth
middleware had already resolved an active tenant from X-Tenant-ID.
The frontend then re-keyed `authStore.tenant` to the home tenant on
every refresh, undoing the switch. Fix: read the active tenant id from
context (`types.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)`) and only fall back to
user.TenantID when context is unset.
The server-side enforcement was correct throughout — every fix here is
purely about not lying to the user with the rendered UI.
2026-05-14 13:55:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
activeTenantID, _ := types.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if activeTenantID == 0 {
|
|
|
|
|
|
activeTenantID = user.TenantID
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if activeTenantID > 0 {
|
|
|
|
|
|
tenant, err = h.tenantService.GetTenantByID(ctx, activeTenantID)
|
2025-09-16 07:39:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
fix(rbac): role-aware UI gates leaked write affordances after tenant switch
When an Owner of tenant A invited user B as a Viewer, B could log in,
switch the active tenant from B's home to A via the user menu, and
still see every write button — Create KB, Upload Document, Edit/Delete
agent — because the role-gate plumbing on the client was wired to the
wrong tenant. The server's RBAC enforcement (PR 2 / PR 5) still blocked
the actual mutations with 403, so no data leaked, but the UI presented
authority the user did not have, which is a confusing and embarrassing
defect.
Five distinct root causes, all on the client / server boundary:
1. `currentTenantRole` (frontend/src/stores/auth.ts) read
`tenant.value.id` — the user's *home* tenant — instead of the active
tenant id. After switching to A, the helper still returned B's home
role (Owner), so every `hasRole(...)` gate in the codebase silently
short-circuited. Fix: read `selectedTenantId` first, fall back to
`tenant.id`.
2. `setMemberships` was only called once, on /auth/login. Hard reloads
(which the tenant switcher triggers) re-ran `getCurrentUser()` via
`App.vue` and `router/index.ts`, but those callers discarded the
`memberships` field of the response, so the auth store kept the
login-time snapshot forever. Role changes between sessions stayed
invisible. Fix: extract memberships in both /auth/me consumers and
feed them into `setMemberships`.
3. `KnowledgeBase.vue`'s `isOwner` compared `kb.tenant_id` to the
active tenant id, so any KB inside the current tenant was treated
as "owned by the caller" — bypassing every role gate below. Fix:
compare against `kb.creator_id` (the field PR 5 introduced) and
require an actual creator match. `canEdit` / `canManage` now layer
`hasRole('admin')` on top so a non-creator with sufficient role can
still manage.
4. `KnowledgeBaseList.vue` and `AgentList.vue` rendered the per-card
more-menu (Settings, Delete, Edit) unconditionally. With the
ownership column from PR 5 this is straightforward to gate on the
client: Settings/Delete now require creator-match or `hasRole('admin')`
per the server's `OwnedKBOrAdmin` / `OwnedAgentOrAdmin` matrix.
5. The axios interceptor (frontend/src/utils/request.ts) had a
"selectedTenantId === defaultTenantId → don't attach X-Tenant-ID"
short-circuit. Any code that wrote the active tenant into
`weknora_tenant` (UserMenu's loadUserInfo, OIDC sync, router
hydrate) made the two values equal, after which the header silently
stopped attaching and subsequent navigation requests landed on the
home tenant. Fix: drop the short-circuit; always attach when
selectedTenantId is set.
Server-side, /auth/me read `user.TenantID` (the immutable home tenant
id stamped at signup) when fetching the tenant for the response, so
the `tenant` field always pointed at home even after the auth
middleware had already resolved an active tenant from X-Tenant-ID.
The frontend then re-keyed `authStore.tenant` to the home tenant on
every refresh, undoing the switch. Fix: read the active tenant id from
context (`types.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)`) and only fall back to
user.TenantID when context is unset.
The server-side enforcement was correct throughout — every fix here is
purely about not lying to the user with the rendered UI.
2026-05-14 13:55:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
logger.Warnf(ctx, "Failed to get tenant info for user %s, tenant ID %d: %v", user.Email, activeTenantID, err)
|
2025-09-16 07:39:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// Don't fail the request if tenant info is not available
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-12-03 03:11:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
userInfo := user.ToUserInfo()
|
|
|
|
|
|
userInfo.CanAccessAllTenants = user.CanAccessAllTenants && h.configInfo.Tenant.EnableCrossTenantAccess
|
refactor(rbac): address PR 1 review feedback
Tighten correctness, security and observability of the tenant RBAC
foundation introduced in 3c4cdd70 in response to internal review.
Bugfixes
- custom_agents.runnable_by_viewer: drop the GORM `default:true` tag.
GORM treats a plain bool's zero value as "unspecified" and silently
rewrites it to the column default on insert, which would prevent
admins from ever creating an agent with viewer-runtime disabled. The
column-level DEFAULT TRUE on the database side still backstops rows
inserted by raw SQL / migrations.
- TenantMemberRepository.HasAnyMembers: replace `Limit(1).Count(&n)`
with `Take(&probe)`. GORM's Count ignores Limit and scans the whole
table, which matters because this runs on the auth middleware's
hot path for users without a cached membership.
- service/user.LoginWithOIDC: include User, Tenant and Memberships in
the OIDCCallbackResponse so the OIDC flow returns the same shape as
password login (previously User and friends were left nil).
Security
- middleware/auth.resolveTenantRole: restrict orphan-tenant
auto-promotion to the caller's home tenant. Cross-tenant superuser
visits and JWTs minted for foreign tenants no longer trigger silent
Owner grants. Two regression tests pin the new behaviour.
- service/user.synthFallbackMembership: default the synthesised role
to Viewer instead of Owner. The login response only feeds UI; the
backend re-derives the real role from tenant_members on every
request, so showing a Viewer UI is preferable to a misleading Owner
UI that would surface admin controls the backend will then 403.
- migrations/versioned/000043_tenant_rbac.down.sql: gate the destructive
drop behind a `weknora.allow_destructive_migration` GUC so an
accidental `migrate down` cannot wipe role data in production.
- frontend/src/stores/auth.ts: comment currentTenantRole as
rendering-only so future PRs cannot mistake the localStorage-backed
value for an authorisation signal.
API contract
- Memberships in LoginResponse and OIDCCallbackResponse now serialises
without omitempty, and buildMembershipsForUser / synthFallbackMembership
always return a non-nil slice — frontend can rely on JSON `[]`.
- handler/auth.GetCurrentUser includes memberships so /auth/me refreshes
recover currentTenantRole after a page reload.
Performance
- Add TenantService.GetTenantsByIDs (with the matching repo method) and
use it inside buildMembershipsForUser to batch tenant-name lookups
instead of issuing one query per membership.
Observability
- Replace the remaining `log.Printf` calls in middleware/auth with
contextual logger.Warnf / logger.Infof so role resolution events ride
the standard request-id / Langfuse trace plumbing. The successful
auto-promote line is tagged `[audit]` for log mining.
Tests
- internal/application/service/tenant_member_test.go: hand-rolled
fakeTenantMemberRepo plus 11 cases covering AddMember validation,
EnsureOwner idempotence, "cannot demote/remove the last Owner",
same-role no-op, ErrInvalidTenantRole / ErrMembershipNotFound, and
the TenantRole.HasPermission lattice.
- internal/middleware/auth_role_test.go: fakeMemberService plus 8 cases
pinning every branch of resolveTenantRole, including the two H1
regressions (cross-tenant superuser must not auto-promote; orphan
auto-promote requires the home tenant).
2026-05-13 12:24:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// 同步返回当前用户的 memberships,让前端在页面刷新(仅命中 /auth/me)
|
|
|
|
|
|
// 后也能恢复 currentTenantRole,避免角色信息只在 login 那一刻可用。
|
|
|
|
|
|
memberships := h.userService.BuildLoginMemberships(ctx, user, tenant)
|
2026-07-13 10:04:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
canCreateTenant := user.CanAccessAllTenants ||
|
|
|
|
|
|
resolveTenantSelfServiceCreationEnabled(ctx, h.configInfo, h.systemSettingSvc)
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
|
|
|
|
|
|
"success": true,
|
2025-09-16 07:39:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
"data": gin.H{
|
2026-07-13 10:04:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
"user": userInfo,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"tenant": dto.NewTenantResponse(ctx, tenant),
|
|
|
|
|
|
"memberships": memberships,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"tenant_required": tenant == nil,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"capabilities": gin.H{
|
|
|
|
|
|
"can_create_tenant": canCreateTenant,
|
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
2025-09-16 07:39:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
},
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-05-18 03:21:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// updateMyPreferencesRequest is the body for PUT /auth/me/preferences.
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Fields are pointers so the handler can distinguish "key not present"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// (preserve existing value) from "explicit false". See
|
|
|
|
|
|
// types.UserPreferences for the persistence-layer counterpart.
|
|
|
|
|
|
type updateMyPreferencesRequest struct {
|
feat(tenant): remember user's last-active workspace across logins
Until now a fresh login (new device, expired refresh token, cleared
browser) always dropped the user into their home tenant, even if they
spend most of their time in a peer workspace. The session-local
X-Tenant-ID override in localStorage gave a "same browser sticky"
effect, but never crossed devices or new sessions.
This adds a small server-side preference, `users.preferences.
last_active_tenant_id`, persisted in the existing jsonb column (no
new migration), and threads it through:
* Backend
* `UserPreferences` gains `LastActiveTenantID *uint64` with sentinel
semantics (`*0` from the PATCH endpoint = clear preference).
* `resolveLoginTenantID` validates the stored id (tenant still
exists + active membership, or CanAccessAllTenants) and falls
back to home on any failure, best-effort clearing the stale
preference so subsequent logins don't pay for it again.
* `Login` and `LoginWithOIDC` resolve once and use the result for
both the JWT `tenant_id` claim and the returned `active_tenant`,
keeping the two in sync. `RefreshToken` rides through
`GenerateTokens` so refresh rotations also land the user back in
their preferred tenant instead of bouncing to home.
* `UpdateUserPreferences` learns to merge the new key.
* `PUT /auth/me/preferences` accepts the new field.
* Frontend
* `Login.vue` now writes the user's HOME tenant id into
`user.tenant_id` (matching the field's documented semantics) and
expresses any active-vs-home divergence via `setSelectedTenant`,
so `useHomeTenant` and the "current"/"home" badges stay correct
after the backend honours a remembered preference. `App.vue`'s
OIDC sync does the same reconciliation.
* `TenantSelector`, `UserMenu` and the post-tenant-create handlers
fire `persistLastActiveTenantPreference` after every successful
user-initiated switch (switching to home sends `0` to clear).
The call is raced against the existing reload-grace window so
most writes finish before the page tears down; lost writes are
recoverable on the next switch.
No new UI. Users will simply notice that, after re-logging in on
another device, they land back in the workspace they were last
using rather than always in their home tenant.
Note: `make docs` is unrelated-broken on `main` (audit_log.go
references `errors.AppError` which swag can't resolve), so the
Swagger artifacts under docs/ are intentionally not regenerated
in this PR. The handler code is the source of truth.
2026-05-18 11:48:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// LastActiveTenantID lets the SPA persist "after a fresh login,
|
|
|
|
|
|
// drop me back into this workspace" across devices. Send a positive
|
2026-07-14 08:13:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// workspace id to set / replace, or 0 to clear. Membership is validated
|
feat(tenant): remember user's last-active workspace across logins
Until now a fresh login (new device, expired refresh token, cleared
browser) always dropped the user into their home tenant, even if they
spend most of their time in a peer workspace. The session-local
X-Tenant-ID override in localStorage gave a "same browser sticky"
effect, but never crossed devices or new sessions.
This adds a small server-side preference, `users.preferences.
last_active_tenant_id`, persisted in the existing jsonb column (no
new migration), and threads it through:
* Backend
* `UserPreferences` gains `LastActiveTenantID *uint64` with sentinel
semantics (`*0` from the PATCH endpoint = clear preference).
* `resolveLoginTenantID` validates the stored id (tenant still
exists + active membership, or CanAccessAllTenants) and falls
back to home on any failure, best-effort clearing the stale
preference so subsequent logins don't pay for it again.
* `Login` and `LoginWithOIDC` resolve once and use the result for
both the JWT `tenant_id` claim and the returned `active_tenant`,
keeping the two in sync. `RefreshToken` rides through
`GenerateTokens` so refresh rotations also land the user back in
their preferred tenant instead of bouncing to home.
* `UpdateUserPreferences` learns to merge the new key.
* `PUT /auth/me/preferences` accepts the new field.
* Frontend
* `Login.vue` now writes the user's HOME tenant id into
`user.tenant_id` (matching the field's documented semantics) and
expresses any active-vs-home divergence via `setSelectedTenant`,
so `useHomeTenant` and the "current"/"home" badges stay correct
after the backend honours a remembered preference. `App.vue`'s
OIDC sync does the same reconciliation.
* `TenantSelector`, `UserMenu` and the post-tenant-create handlers
fire `persistLastActiveTenantPreference` after every successful
user-initiated switch (switching to home sends `0` to clear).
The call is raced against the existing reload-grace window so
most writes finish before the page tears down; lost writes are
recoverable on the next switch.
No new UI. Users will simply notice that, after re-logging in on
another device, they land back in the workspace they were last
using rather than always in their home tenant.
Note: `make docs` is unrelated-broken on `main` (audit_log.go
references `errors.AppError` which swag can't resolve), so the
Swagger artifacts under docs/ are intentionally not regenerated
in this PR. The handler code is the source of truth.
2026-05-18 11:48:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// at next login, not here. Nil = field omitted from the PATCH and
|
|
|
|
|
|
// stays untouched.
|
|
|
|
|
|
LastActiveTenantID *uint64 `json:"last_active_tenant_id"`
|
2026-05-18 03:21:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// UpdateMyPreferences godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 更新当前用户的个性化设置
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 按 PATCH 语义合并用户偏好(仅覆盖请求体里出现的字段,其余字段保持不变),
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 数据存放在 users.preferences (JSON),跨设备/浏览器自动同步。
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Param request body updateMyPreferencesRequest true "Preferences patch"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]interface{} "更新后的偏好"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 400 {object} errors.AppError "请求参数错误"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 401 {object} errors.AppError "未授权"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Security Bearer
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/me/preferences [put]
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) UpdateMyPreferences(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
user, err := h.userService.GetCurrentUser(ctx)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewUnauthorizedError("Failed to get user information").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var req updateMyPreferencesRequest
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Invalid preferences request").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
patch := types.UserPreferences{
|
feat(tenant): remember user's last-active workspace across logins
Until now a fresh login (new device, expired refresh token, cleared
browser) always dropped the user into their home tenant, even if they
spend most of their time in a peer workspace. The session-local
X-Tenant-ID override in localStorage gave a "same browser sticky"
effect, but never crossed devices or new sessions.
This adds a small server-side preference, `users.preferences.
last_active_tenant_id`, persisted in the existing jsonb column (no
new migration), and threads it through:
* Backend
* `UserPreferences` gains `LastActiveTenantID *uint64` with sentinel
semantics (`*0` from the PATCH endpoint = clear preference).
* `resolveLoginTenantID` validates the stored id (tenant still
exists + active membership, or CanAccessAllTenants) and falls
back to home on any failure, best-effort clearing the stale
preference so subsequent logins don't pay for it again.
* `Login` and `LoginWithOIDC` resolve once and use the result for
both the JWT `tenant_id` claim and the returned `active_tenant`,
keeping the two in sync. `RefreshToken` rides through
`GenerateTokens` so refresh rotations also land the user back in
their preferred tenant instead of bouncing to home.
* `UpdateUserPreferences` learns to merge the new key.
* `PUT /auth/me/preferences` accepts the new field.
* Frontend
* `Login.vue` now writes the user's HOME tenant id into
`user.tenant_id` (matching the field's documented semantics) and
expresses any active-vs-home divergence via `setSelectedTenant`,
so `useHomeTenant` and the "current"/"home" badges stay correct
after the backend honours a remembered preference. `App.vue`'s
OIDC sync does the same reconciliation.
* `TenantSelector`, `UserMenu` and the post-tenant-create handlers
fire `persistLastActiveTenantPreference` after every successful
user-initiated switch (switching to home sends `0` to clear).
The call is raced against the existing reload-grace window so
most writes finish before the page tears down; lost writes are
recoverable on the next switch.
No new UI. Users will simply notice that, after re-logging in on
another device, they land back in the workspace they were last
using rather than always in their home tenant.
Note: `make docs` is unrelated-broken on `main` (audit_log.go
references `errors.AppError` which swag can't resolve), so the
Swagger artifacts under docs/ are intentionally not regenerated
in this PR. The handler code is the source of truth.
2026-05-18 11:48:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
LastActiveTenantID: req.LastActiveTenantID,
|
2026-05-18 03:21:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
prefs, err := h.userService.UpdateUserPreferences(ctx, user.ID, patch)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to update preferences for user %s: %v", user.Email, err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewBadRequestError("Failed to update preferences").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
|
|
|
|
|
|
"success": true,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"data": prefs,
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-12-16 08:40:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// ChangePassword godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 修改密码
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 修改当前用户的登录密码
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Param request body object{old_password=string,new_password=string} true "密码修改请求"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]interface{} "修改成功"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 400 {object} errors.AppError "请求参数错误"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Security Bearer
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/change-password [post]
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) ChangePassword(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Info(ctx, "Start password change")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var req struct {
|
|
|
|
|
|
OldPassword string `json:"old_password" binding:"required"`
|
|
|
|
|
|
NewPassword string `json:"new_password" binding:"required,min=6"`
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Failed to parse password change request", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Invalid password change request").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Get current user
|
|
|
|
|
|
user, err := h.userService.GetCurrentUser(ctx)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to get current user: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewUnauthorizedError("Failed to get user information").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Change password
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = h.userService.ChangePassword(ctx, user.ID, req.OldPassword, req.NewPassword)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to change password: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewBadRequestError("Password change failed").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Infof(ctx, "Password changed successfully for user: %s", user.Email)
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
|
|
|
|
|
|
"success": true,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"message": "Password changed successfully",
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// GetAuthConfig godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 获取认证配置
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 返回当前部署的注册模式等公开认证配置,供前端决定是否展示注册入口
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]interface{} "认证配置"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/config [get]
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
|
|
// GetAuthConfig is intentionally a no-auth endpoint: the frontend reads
|
|
|
|
|
|
// it on app load to decide whether to show the Register tab. We expose
|
|
|
|
|
|
// only what the UI strictly needs (registration_mode); other config
|
|
|
|
|
|
// stays internal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) GetAuthConfig(c *gin.Context) {
|
2026-05-24 13:38:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// Same source-of-truth as Register's gate, so the UI hide-the-button
|
|
|
|
|
|
// signal can never disagree with the API enforcement signal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
mode := h.resolveRegistrationMode(c.Request.Context())
|
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
|
|
|
|
|
|
"success": true,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"registration_mode": mode,
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// SwitchTenant godoc
|
2026-07-14 08:13:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 切换激活空间
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 为当前用户在目标空间重新签发访问令牌;要求该用户在目标空间存在 active 成员关系
|
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Param request body object{tenant_id=integer,refresh_token=string} true "切换请求"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} types.LoginResponse
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 400 {object} errors.AppError "参数错误"
|
2026-07-14 08:13:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 403 {object} errors.AppError "无该空间成员关系"
|
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// @Security Bearer
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/switch-tenant [post]
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
|
|
// SwitchTenant is the v1 backend hook for the tenant-switcher UI added
|
|
|
|
|
|
// in PR 3. The current PR ships the endpoint so multi-tenant tests can
|
|
|
|
|
|
// exercise the membership flow end-to-end before the frontend lands.
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) SwitchTenant(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var req struct {
|
|
|
|
|
|
TenantID uint64 `json:"tenant_id" binding:"required"`
|
|
|
|
|
|
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
|
2026-07-14 08:13:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Invalid workspace switch request").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
user, err := h.userService.GetCurrentUser(ctx)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil || user == nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewUnauthorizedError("not authenticated")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resp, err := h.userService.SwitchTenant(ctx, user, req.TenantID, req.RefreshToken)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "SwitchTenant failed user=%s target=%d: %v", user.ID, req.TenantID, err)
|
2026-07-14 08:13:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewForbiddenError("workspace switch failed").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-07-02 04:34:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, dto.NewAuthLoginResponse(resp))
|
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-07-02 06:49:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2026-04-11 04:47:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 自动初始化(Lite 桌面版)
|
2026-07-14 08:13:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// @Description Lite 版专用:首次启动时自动创建默认用户和空间并返回令牌,后续启动直接签发令牌,免除手动注册/登录流程
|
2026-04-11 04:47:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} types.LoginResponse
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 403 {object} errors.AppError "非 Lite 版本"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/auto-setup [post]
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) AutoSetup(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if Edition != "lite" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewForbiddenError("auto-setup is only available in lite edition")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const defaultEmail = "admin@weknora.local"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
user, _ := h.userService.GetUserByEmail(ctx, defaultEmail)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if user == nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Info(ctx, "Auto-setup: creating default user and tenant for lite edition")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
randomBytes := make([]byte, 24)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(randomBytes); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewInternalServerError("auto-setup failed: unable to generate credentials")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
randomPassword := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(randomBytes)
|
|
|
|
|
|
randomUsername := fmt.Sprintf("user_%s", base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(randomBytes[:6]))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_, err := h.userService.Register(ctx, &types.RegisterRequest{
|
|
|
|
|
|
Username: randomUsername,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Email: defaultEmail,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Password: randomPassword,
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Auto-setup: failed to register default user: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewInternalServerError("auto-setup failed").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
user, _ = h.userService.GetUserByEmail(ctx, defaultEmail)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if user == nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewInternalServerError("auto-setup failed: user not found after registration")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
accessToken, refreshToken, err := h.userService.GenerateTokens(ctx, user)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Auto-setup: failed to generate tokens: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewInternalServerError("auto-setup failed").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tenant, _ := h.tenantService.GetTenantByID(ctx, user.TenantID)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Info(ctx, "Auto-setup: completed successfully")
|
2026-07-02 04:34:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, dto.NewAuthLoginResponse(&types.LoginResponse{
|
2026-04-11 04:47:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Success: true,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Message: "Auto-setup successful",
|
|
|
|
|
|
User: user,
|
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ActiveTenant: tenant,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Memberships: []types.Membership{{
|
|
|
|
|
|
TenantID: user.TenantID,
|
|
|
|
|
|
TenantName: tenantNameOrEmpty(tenant),
|
|
|
|
|
|
Role: types.TenantRoleOwner,
|
|
|
|
|
|
}},
|
2026-04-11 04:47:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Token: accessToken,
|
|
|
|
|
|
RefreshToken: refreshToken,
|
2026-07-02 04:34:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}))
|
2026-04-11 04:47:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// tenantNameOrEmpty returns t.Name when t is non-nil, "" otherwise.
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Used by AutoSetup to populate Membership.TenantName without crashing
|
|
|
|
|
|
// if the tenant lookup failed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
func tenantNameOrEmpty(t *types.Tenant) string {
|
|
|
|
|
|
if t == nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ""
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
return t.Name
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-12-16 08:40:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// ValidateToken godoc
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Summary 验证令牌
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Description 验证访问令牌是否有效
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Tags 认证
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Accept json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Produce json
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]interface{} "令牌有效"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Failure 401 {object} errors.AppError "令牌无效"
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Security Bearer
|
|
|
|
|
|
// @Router /auth/validate [get]
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
func (h *AuthHandler) ValidateToken(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Info(ctx, "Start token validation")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Extract token from Authorization header
|
|
|
|
|
|
authHeader := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
|
|
|
|
|
|
if authHeader == "" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Missing Authorization header")
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Authorization header is required")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Parse Bearer token
|
|
|
|
|
|
tokenParts := strings.Split(authHeader, " ")
|
|
|
|
|
|
if len(tokenParts) != 2 || tokenParts[0] != "Bearer" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Error(ctx, "Invalid Authorization header format")
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewValidationError("Invalid Authorization header format")
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
token := tokenParts[1]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Validate token
|
fix(auth): honour JWT tenant_id claim in middleware
POST /auth/switch-tenant mints an access token whose `tenant_id` claim
points to the target tenant, but the middleware previously discarded
that claim entirely:
user, err := userService.ValidateToken(ctx, token) // returned only *User
targetTenantID := user.TenantID // always the home tenant
The session therefore stayed scoped to the user's home tenant despite
the supposedly fresh token, making the new endpoint a no-op once
the request hit any tenant-scoped query.
This change widens the contract:
- UserService.ValidateToken now returns (user, activeTenantID, error)
where activeTenantID is the JWT's `tenant_id` claim, falling back to
user.TenantID when the claim is absent (backward compatibility with
pre-RBAC tokens still in the wild).
- middleware/auth.go uses activeTenantID as the default target before
applying any X-Tenant-ID header override, and recomputes
crossTenantSwitch from `activeTenantID != user.TenantID` so the
resolveTenantRole branches stay correct for switch-tenant sessions.
- The non-middleware /auth/validate handler in handler/auth.go absorbs
the new return value (it only cares about user identity).
Tests:
- internal/application/service/user_jwt_test.go pins the JWT->tenant-id
projection (`tenantIDFromClaims`) — claim present beats fallback,
zero/negative/string claims fall back, int64/uint64 are accepted for
test-built tokens.
Required for PR 2 multi-tenant integration tests, where a single user
needs to switch between Owner-in-A and Viewer-in-B sessions and observe
distinct authority on each side.
2026-05-13 12:40:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
user, _, err := h.userService.ValidateToken(ctx, token)
|
2025-09-15 18:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Errorf(ctx, "Failed to validate token: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
appErr := errors.NewUnauthorizedError("Token validation failed").WithDetails(err.Error())
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.Error(appErr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.Infof(ctx, "Token validated successfully for user: %s", user.Email)
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
|
|
|
|
|
|
"success": true,
|
|
|
|
|
|
"message": "Token is valid",
|
|
|
|
|
|
"user": user.ToUserInfo(),
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|