WeKnora/migrations/sqlite/000000_init.down.sql

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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tenant_invitations;
2026-07-05 02:25:37 +00:00
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tenant_api_keys;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS wiki_page_revisions;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS wiki_page_issues;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS wiki_pages;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS wiki_folders;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_kb_pins;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_resource_favorites;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tenant_disabled_shared_agents;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS agent_shares;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS organization_join_requests;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS kb_shares;
feat(rbac): lift org membership from per-user to per-tenant (Plan 3, #1303) Before this change, the `organization_members` table keyed on user_id — joining an org as a Viewer in tenant T meant only that one user got visibility on shared KBs/agents, while the rest of T (including its Owner) saw nothing. The mismatch surfaced as confusing UX bugs: "my colleague shared this with us, why can't I see it?" This change replaces `organization_members` with `organization_tenant_members`. Membership and Org-RBAC role now key on (org_id, tenant_id); `representative_user_id` stays as a display-only label of the user who first brought the tenant in. Permission resolution gains a 3-D cap so tenant-RBAC stays honest under cross-tenant sharing: effective = min(share.Permission, tenant_org_role, tenant_role_cap) where tenant_role_cap pins tenant Viewers to OrgRoleViewer regardless of the org-level grant. A Viewer in their own tenant cannot edit a shared KB even if the org granted Editor — preserves the "Viewer = read-only everywhere" promise. Migration 000045 backfills `organization_tenant_members` from the old table by collapsing each (org, tenant) group to its max role, then renames the old table to `organization_members_pre_plan3` for safe rollback. Sqlite mirror (Lite mode) is fresh-bootstrap: the init schema replaces the old table directly. Routes: member-management URLs change from `:user_id` to `:tenant_id`. Org create / join / leave now require Admin+ in the caller's tenant — joining an Org affects everyone in T, so the decision can't sit with a Viewer. Frontend: OrganizationSettingsModal + store update to address members by tenant_id.
2026-05-15 13:49:54 +00:00
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS organization_tenant_members;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS organizations;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS custom_agents;
feat(agent): human-in-the-loop approval for MCP tool calls (#1173) Add an opt-in human approval gate so Agent runs pause before executing MCP tools that operators flag as dangerous, surface an approval card in the chat UI, and only resume after the user approves (optionally with edited args) or rejects. Backend - New mcp_tool_approvals table + repo/service to mark per-tool approval required (PG migration 000042 + sqlite init). - approval.Gate coordinates RequestAndWait / Resolve with sync.Once delivery, configurable timeout, and Redis Pub/Sub fan-out so multi- replica deployments work without sticky sessions. - MCPTool.Execute integrates the gate; uses a round-level ApprovalCtx (without the per-tool 60s timeout) for the wait, and re-derives a fresh 60s exec ctx after approval so CallTool keeps a full window. - New SSE response types (tool_approval_required / _resolved) and EventBus events plumb approval state to AgentStreamDisplay. - REST: list/set per-tool approval flag, resolve pending approval. - Configurable via agent.tool_approval_timeout_seconds (yaml) or WEKNORA_AGENT_TOOL_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT env (accepts seconds or Go duration). Frontend - MCP settings: per-tool "require approval" switch on the test panel. - Chat: ToolApprovalCard renders the pause point with editable JSON args, validation feedback, mm:ss countdown that turns warning/danger near deadline, and a resolved state that retains context. - i18n strings added for zh-CN / en-US / ko-KR / ru-RU. Docs - docs/zh/mcp-approval.md covering behavior, config, API, deployment considerations (Redis cross-instance, restart limitations).
2026-05-10 13:23:49 +00:00
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS mcp_tool_approvals;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS mcp_services;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS knowledge_tags;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS auth_tokens;
feat(rbac): per-tenant audit log for RBAC events (PR 6, #1303) PR 1-5 of the multi-tenant RBAC series enforce the role matrix; what they don't do is keep a durable record of who did what. Today the RBAC middleware logs "[rbac] role insufficient ..." to stderr - perishable, not searchable. Operators cannot answer "who removed Alice from tenant T-foo on Tuesday" or "did we 403 a probing user 200 times last hour" after the fact. This PR adds a generic per-tenant audit log that: - Captures mutating RBAC actions (member add/remove/role-change/leave) durably from the tenant_member service after the repo write succeeds. - Captures enforcement rejections (RequireRole / RequireOwnershipOrRole denies under EnableRBAC=true) via a gin-context-injected hook. - Sliding-window dedup (1 minute) on (tenant, actor, action, path) for denied events so a probing client cannot flood audit_logs. - Default-on - no extra env flag. Schema is generic enough for future KB / agent / datasource events to reuse via new action namespaces without another migration. Schema (migration 000044) mirrors wiki_log_entries' shape: a single audit_logs table with action, target_type/id, request path/method, outcome, and a JSONB details column. Three indexes: (tenant_id, id DESC) for the per-tenant cursor feed, actor_user_id for "what did Alice do", (tenant_id, action) for both the action filter and the dedup lookup. Sqlite mirror added for Lite mode. Wiring is nil-safe: the audit field on tenantMemberService and the gin-context lookup in rbac.go both tolerate a nil service so existing tests construct without a stub and dormant deployments degrade gracefully if the provider is misconfigured. The query API is GET /tenants/:id/audit-log, gated by Admin+ on top of the existing PathTenantMatch (denial histories should not surface to ordinary members). Cursor-paginated by descending id (sidesteps the duplicate-timestamp tie-breaking that BIGSERIAL trivially solves). Frontend: TenantMembers.vue gets a t-tabs wrapper with Members (existing) and Audit log (new) tabs; the audit tab is gated to Admin+ to mirror the server, lazy-loads on first open, paginates via the next_cursor pattern, and renders coloured chips per action/outcome so an operator can scan for anomalies. i18n keys added in all four locales. Tests: 14 new tests across service (6), middleware (4), and handler (4). Service tests pin the dedup window behaviour (writes again after expiry, dedup is per-actor-per-path, degrades on lookup error). Middleware tests pin both reject sites' audit hook and the "dormant mode does not fire" + "nil audit does not panic" invariants. Handler tests pin the cursor envelope and that an empty page returns next_cursor=0. Out of scope: per-action ACL on the audit log, retention/TTL job, KB/agent/datasource event wiring (schema supports it - just no emitters yet), async writes, frontend filter UI.
2026-05-14 13:07:48 +00:00
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS audit_logs;
feat(rbac): add tenant_members schema and auth wiring (PR 1 of 3, #1303) Lay the foundation for tenant-level RBAC without enforcing it yet. Schema, types, middleware lookup, and login-flow shape changes ship now; RequireRole/route annotations and member-management endpoints follow in PR 2 and PR 3. Highlights: - New tenant_members table (Postgres + SQLite) with (user_id, tenant_id) unique key and (owner|admin|contributor|viewer) role values. Migration 000043 backfills one row per existing user, marking the earliest-created active user in each tenant as Owner and the rest as Contributor. - KnowledgeBase.creator_id and CustomAgent.runnable_by_viewer added so PR 2 can wire ownership-based and Viewer-runtime checks. - Auth middleware loads the active TenantMember row, sets a new TenantRoleContextKey, and falls back via three escape hatches: cross-tenant superusers (CanAccessAllTenants) get Admin in the target tenant; orphan tenants (zero members) auto-promote the first authenticating human to Owner; and when tenant.enable_rbac is false (the v1 default) unmatched lookups fail open with Admin to preserve current behaviour. - Register / OIDC provisioning now insert an Owner membership for the registrant via TenantMemberService.EnsureOwner. - LoginResponse renamed tenant -> active_tenant and gained a memberships array. POST /auth/switch-tenant issues a fresh token pair scoped to a target membership; GET /auth/config exposes auth.registration_mode for the frontend register-tab gating. - New config keys: auth.registration_mode (self_serve | invite_only, defaults to self_serve) and tenant.enable_rbac (defaults to false). Both have WEKNORA_* env overrides. - Frontend store persists memberships and exposes currentTenantRole; Login.vue calls /auth/config and hides the Register tab in invite_only mode. Go SDK types updated to match the new LoginResponse shape.
2026-05-13 11:47:48 +00:00
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tenant_members;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS users;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS chunks;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS messages;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS temporary_documents;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sessions;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS knowledges;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS knowledge_bases;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS storage_backends;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS resource_access_grants;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS resource_bindings;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS resources;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS models;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tenants;