WeKnora/cli/cmd/auth/refresh.go

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feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
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package auth
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/iostreams"
sdk "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/client"
)
type RefreshOptions struct {
feat(cli): --dry-run + risk metadata + validation parity on 19 mutations Two intertwined agent safety nets that share the same files: 1. --dry-run flag for offline preview of mutation commands 2. Risk: metadata + SetRisk helper for destructive command surfaces Coverage (19 mutation commands with --dry-run): kb.create/edit/delete agent.create/edit/delete doc.create/upload/fetch/delete doc.delete_all (special variant) session.delete chunk.delete profile.add/remove auth.refresh/logout link unlink api.{post,put,patch,delete} (api.get + --dry-run rejected, exit 2) Envelope additions (omitempty in non-dry-run paths): meta.dry_run: bool true when --dry-run was used meta.plan: map {action, args} per the per-command taxonomy Risk: metadata -------------- cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, action) stamps cobra.Annotations with risk.level=destructive + risk.action=<action> on the 9 destructive commands. The SetAgentHelp wrapper prepends a "Risk: <action> (destructive)" line in the default text help path so agents see a clear warning before parsing Usage. WEKNORA_AGENT_HELP=1 JSON path stays unchanged — structured agent-help already carries warnings[]. Validation parity with the live path ------------------------------------ Every pure-local validation (flag presence, mutual exclusion, enum bounds, URL/regex format, ResolveKBLocal for KB resolution that does not require an SDK call) runs BEFORE the dry-run gate. This matches the industry-standard "preview shows what live would do" contract: --dry-run accepts exactly the same invocations the live path accepts and rejects exactly the same invocations the live path rejects, modulo the side-effecting work itself. The side-effecting work (SDK calls, file writes, keyring writes, server- side name → id resolution) is what --dry-run actually gates. Each mutation file pairs its RunE validation block with a regression test under *_dry_run_test.go / dryrun_validation_test.go so future refactors don't reintroduce the gap. Helper surface -------------- - HandleDryRun(cmd, dryRun, plan) extracts the early-return so the 19 RunE call sites stay 3 lines each. - EmitDryRun routes through FormatOptions.Emit, inheriting _notice / TTY indent / --jq filtering for free. - ResolveKBLocal mirrors ResolveKB but never calls the SDK; dry-run paths use it so the plan reports the raw --kb value (UUID or name) without a name → id lookup. Streaming commands (chat, session ask, session continue-stream) are deliberately excluded: a buffered plan makes no sense for an event stream. Lock semantics in the dry-run path: - destructive + --dry-run: exit 0, no exit-10 confirmation prompt - --dry-run + -y: byte-identical envelope to --dry-run alone - --dry-run + --jq: filter applies to the preview envelope normally
2026-05-27 20:28:48 +00:00
DryRun bool
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
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}
// authRefreshFields enumerates the fields surfaced for `--format json` discovery
// on `auth refresh`. Token values are intentionally omitted - see refreshResult.
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
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var authRefreshFields = []string{"profile"}
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
// refreshResult is the typed payload emitted under data on success. Token
// values are intentionally NOT included - emitting them would leak secrets
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
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// into stdout / agent transcripts. Agents needing to verify the new token
// can re-run `weknora auth status` (live API check).
type refreshResult struct {
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
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Profile string `json:"profile"`
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
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}
// NewCmdRefresh builds `weknora auth refresh`. Renews the JWT access
// token by spending the stored refresh_token via POST /auth/refresh -
refactor(cli): v0.3 cross-cutting cleanup Cross-cutting findings surfaced by the branch-completion review. Perf bug: - Factory.Client closure was not memoized. Factory.ResolveKB internally calls f.Client() to resolve --kb name → id, then the command's RunE calls f.Client() again. Two SDK clients, two keyring reads, two AuthRetryTransport allocations per name-resolved invocation, with *independent* token state (a refresh in one was invisible to the other). Switched to sync.Once like Secrets already does. Silent bug bait: - cmdutil.NormalizeHost docstring claimed CodeInputMissingFlag for the empty case; code returned CodeInputInvalidArgument. Aligned doc to code (present-but-empty is a bad value, not a missing flag). Agent contract gaps: - Five user-facing subcommands lacked SetAgentHelp: auth login / logout / list / status and chat. Added concise strings with error- code call-outs so agents can branch without parsing human strings. Helper extraction (≥3 callers): - text.KnowledgeDisplayName(fileName, title, id) — byte-identical formatter that was in both cmd/doc/list.go and cmd/search/docs.go. Takes fields directly so internal/text stays SDK-free. - cmdutil.WrapHTTP(cause, fmt, args...) *Error — replaces the `Wrapf(ClassifyHTTPError(err), err, ...)` pattern across 24 SDK call sites. Sed-driven migration; off-pattern shapes in chat.go (used streamErr) and cmdutil/kb.go (in-package) hand-edited. Contract test gains a comment update: post-migration the dominant pattern is WrapHTTP which the AST scanner skips entirely (only NewError/Wrapf selectors inspected); ClassifyHTTPErrorOutputs() bridge still covers the dynamic codes those paths can yield. UX consistency: - cmd/doc/list.go --page-size help now reads "Items per page (1..1000)" matching cmd/session/list.go. The bounds validation already enforced 1..1000; the help text was the last drift. Comment-discipline sweep: - Deleted the WHAT-only "*Options captures `weknora ...` flag state" docstring across 23 files (context, kb, auth, doc, session, search, chat, doctor, link). Where the line carried a real WHY clause (kb/delete, doc/delete, session/delete, kb/edit), kept the WHY and dropped only the leading WHAT phrase. - Stripped third-party project-name attribution from inline comments and one user-visible flag-help string across ~40 files in cli/cmd and cli/internal (plus 4 test-file comments). Removed phrases like "Mirrors `gh X`", "borrowed from lark-cli", "kubectl-style", "gcloud `--project`", "Stripe pattern", and the embedded GitHub URLs pointing at those projects. Behavioral descriptions and the WHY behind each comment are preserved; only the upstream-name attribution is gone. Inspiration / north-star references belong in cli/AGENTS.md (the design doc) and commit messages, not scattered through every file. Triggered by an audit round that surfaced several false / fragile parity claims (e.g. "Mirrors `gh repo edit`" — gh repo edit has no --name flag; "matches gcloud `--project` id-or-name" — gcloud's --project accepts ID only). Rather than fix them one by one, the whole category of in-comment external-project references was stripped uniformly.
2026-05-12 15:42:20 +00:00
// the standard OAuth refresh-token grant.
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
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//
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
2026-05-21 10:41:56 +00:00
// API-key profiles are rejected - they have no refresh semantic;
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
// rotate the key via the server UI instead.
func NewCmdRefresh(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
opts := &RefreshOptions{}
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "refresh",
Short: "Renew the JWT access token using the stored refresh token",
Long: `Reads the refresh token previously stored by ` + "`weknora auth login`" + ` and
exchanges it for a new access + refresh token pair via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh.
Both new tokens replace the existing entries in the OS keyring.
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
2026-05-21 10:41:56 +00:00
API-key profiles are rejected with input.invalid_argument - they have no
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
refresh semantic. Rotate the key in the server UI instead.`,
Example: ` weknora auth refresh # refresh the active profile
weknora --profile staging auth refresh # refresh a specific profile`,
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
Args: cobra.NoArgs,
RunE: func(c *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
fopts, err := cmdutil.CheckFormatFlag(c)
if err != nil {
return err
}
fopts.ResolveDefault(iostreams.IO.IsStdoutTTY())
feat(cli): --dry-run + risk metadata + validation parity on 19 mutations Two intertwined agent safety nets that share the same files: 1. --dry-run flag for offline preview of mutation commands 2. Risk: metadata + SetRisk helper for destructive command surfaces Coverage (19 mutation commands with --dry-run): kb.create/edit/delete agent.create/edit/delete doc.create/upload/fetch/delete doc.delete_all (special variant) session.delete chunk.delete profile.add/remove auth.refresh/logout link unlink api.{post,put,patch,delete} (api.get + --dry-run rejected, exit 2) Envelope additions (omitempty in non-dry-run paths): meta.dry_run: bool true when --dry-run was used meta.plan: map {action, args} per the per-command taxonomy Risk: metadata -------------- cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, action) stamps cobra.Annotations with risk.level=destructive + risk.action=<action> on the 9 destructive commands. The SetAgentHelp wrapper prepends a "Risk: <action> (destructive)" line in the default text help path so agents see a clear warning before parsing Usage. WEKNORA_AGENT_HELP=1 JSON path stays unchanged — structured agent-help already carries warnings[]. Validation parity with the live path ------------------------------------ Every pure-local validation (flag presence, mutual exclusion, enum bounds, URL/regex format, ResolveKBLocal for KB resolution that does not require an SDK call) runs BEFORE the dry-run gate. This matches the industry-standard "preview shows what live would do" contract: --dry-run accepts exactly the same invocations the live path accepts and rejects exactly the same invocations the live path rejects, modulo the side-effecting work itself. The side-effecting work (SDK calls, file writes, keyring writes, server- side name → id resolution) is what --dry-run actually gates. Each mutation file pairs its RunE validation block with a regression test under *_dry_run_test.go / dryrun_validation_test.go so future refactors don't reintroduce the gap. Helper surface -------------- - HandleDryRun(cmd, dryRun, plan) extracts the early-return so the 19 RunE call sites stay 3 lines each. - EmitDryRun routes through FormatOptions.Emit, inheriting _notice / TTY indent / --jq filtering for free. - ResolveKBLocal mirrors ResolveKB but never calls the SDK; dry-run paths use it so the plan reports the raw --kb value (UUID or name) without a name → id lookup. Streaming commands (chat, session ask, session continue-stream) are deliberately excluded: a buffered plan makes no sense for an event stream. Lock semantics in the dry-run path: - destructive + --dry-run: exit 0, no exit-10 confirmation prompt - --dry-run + -y: byte-identical envelope to --dry-run alone - --dry-run + --jq: filter applies to the preview envelope normally
2026-05-27 20:28:48 +00:00
// Pure-local validation runs before the dry-run gate so --dry-run
// rejects identically to the live path. Same typed errors as
// runRefresh (kept there for direct-call callers).
cfg, cfgErr := f.Config()
if cfgErr != nil {
return cfgErr
}
name := cfg.CurrentProfile
feat(cli): --dry-run + risk metadata + validation parity on 19 mutations Two intertwined agent safety nets that share the same files: 1. --dry-run flag for offline preview of mutation commands 2. Risk: metadata + SetRisk helper for destructive command surfaces Coverage (19 mutation commands with --dry-run): kb.create/edit/delete agent.create/edit/delete doc.create/upload/fetch/delete doc.delete_all (special variant) session.delete chunk.delete profile.add/remove auth.refresh/logout link unlink api.{post,put,patch,delete} (api.get + --dry-run rejected, exit 2) Envelope additions (omitempty in non-dry-run paths): meta.dry_run: bool true when --dry-run was used meta.plan: map {action, args} per the per-command taxonomy Risk: metadata -------------- cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, action) stamps cobra.Annotations with risk.level=destructive + risk.action=<action> on the 9 destructive commands. The SetAgentHelp wrapper prepends a "Risk: <action> (destructive)" line in the default text help path so agents see a clear warning before parsing Usage. WEKNORA_AGENT_HELP=1 JSON path stays unchanged — structured agent-help already carries warnings[]. Validation parity with the live path ------------------------------------ Every pure-local validation (flag presence, mutual exclusion, enum bounds, URL/regex format, ResolveKBLocal for KB resolution that does not require an SDK call) runs BEFORE the dry-run gate. This matches the industry-standard "preview shows what live would do" contract: --dry-run accepts exactly the same invocations the live path accepts and rejects exactly the same invocations the live path rejects, modulo the side-effecting work itself. The side-effecting work (SDK calls, file writes, keyring writes, server- side name → id resolution) is what --dry-run actually gates. Each mutation file pairs its RunE validation block with a regression test under *_dry_run_test.go / dryrun_validation_test.go so future refactors don't reintroduce the gap. Helper surface -------------- - HandleDryRun(cmd, dryRun, plan) extracts the early-return so the 19 RunE call sites stay 3 lines each. - EmitDryRun routes through FormatOptions.Emit, inheriting _notice / TTY indent / --jq filtering for free. - ResolveKBLocal mirrors ResolveKB but never calls the SDK; dry-run paths use it so the plan reports the raw --kb value (UUID or name) without a name → id lookup. Streaming commands (chat, session ask, session continue-stream) are deliberately excluded: a buffered plan makes no sense for an event stream. Lock semantics in the dry-run path: - destructive + --dry-run: exit 0, no exit-10 confirmation prompt - --dry-run + -y: byte-identical envelope to --dry-run alone - --dry-run + --jq: filter applies to the preview envelope normally
2026-05-27 20:28:48 +00:00
if name == "" {
return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeAuthUnauthenticated,
"no active profile configured; run `weknora auth login` to set one up")
feat(cli): --dry-run + risk metadata + validation parity on 19 mutations Two intertwined agent safety nets that share the same files: 1. --dry-run flag for offline preview of mutation commands 2. Risk: metadata + SetRisk helper for destructive command surfaces Coverage (19 mutation commands with --dry-run): kb.create/edit/delete agent.create/edit/delete doc.create/upload/fetch/delete doc.delete_all (special variant) session.delete chunk.delete profile.add/remove auth.refresh/logout link unlink api.{post,put,patch,delete} (api.get + --dry-run rejected, exit 2) Envelope additions (omitempty in non-dry-run paths): meta.dry_run: bool true when --dry-run was used meta.plan: map {action, args} per the per-command taxonomy Risk: metadata -------------- cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, action) stamps cobra.Annotations with risk.level=destructive + risk.action=<action> on the 9 destructive commands. The SetAgentHelp wrapper prepends a "Risk: <action> (destructive)" line in the default text help path so agents see a clear warning before parsing Usage. WEKNORA_AGENT_HELP=1 JSON path stays unchanged — structured agent-help already carries warnings[]. Validation parity with the live path ------------------------------------ Every pure-local validation (flag presence, mutual exclusion, enum bounds, URL/regex format, ResolveKBLocal for KB resolution that does not require an SDK call) runs BEFORE the dry-run gate. This matches the industry-standard "preview shows what live would do" contract: --dry-run accepts exactly the same invocations the live path accepts and rejects exactly the same invocations the live path rejects, modulo the side-effecting work itself. The side-effecting work (SDK calls, file writes, keyring writes, server- side name → id resolution) is what --dry-run actually gates. Each mutation file pairs its RunE validation block with a regression test under *_dry_run_test.go / dryrun_validation_test.go so future refactors don't reintroduce the gap. Helper surface -------------- - HandleDryRun(cmd, dryRun, plan) extracts the early-return so the 19 RunE call sites stay 3 lines each. - EmitDryRun routes through FormatOptions.Emit, inheriting _notice / TTY indent / --jq filtering for free. - ResolveKBLocal mirrors ResolveKB but never calls the SDK; dry-run paths use it so the plan reports the raw --kb value (UUID or name) without a name → id lookup. Streaming commands (chat, session ask, session continue-stream) are deliberately excluded: a buffered plan makes no sense for an event stream. Lock semantics in the dry-run path: - destructive + --dry-run: exit 0, no exit-10 confirmation prompt - --dry-run + -y: byte-identical envelope to --dry-run alone - --dry-run + --jq: filter applies to the preview envelope normally
2026-05-27 20:28:48 +00:00
}
prof, ok := cfg.Profiles[name]
if !ok {
return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeLocalProfileNotFound,
fmt.Sprintf("profile not found: %s", name))
}
if prof.Host == "" {
return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeLocalConfigCorrupt,
fmt.Sprintf("profile %q has no host", name))
}
if prof.RefreshRef == "" {
hint := "api-key profiles can't be refreshed - rotate the key in the server UI and run `weknora auth login --with-token`"
if prof.APIKeyRef == "" {
hint = "no refresh token stored - run `weknora auth login` to authenticate"
}
return &cmdutil.Error{
Code: cmdutil.CodeInputInvalidArgument,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("profile %q has no refresh token", name),
Hint: hint,
}
}
if handled, err := cmdutil.HandleDryRun(c, opts.DryRun, cmdutil.DryRunPlan{
Action: "auth.refresh",
Args: map[string]any{},
}); handled {
return err
}
return runRefresh(c.Context(), opts, fopts, f, defaultRefresher)
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
},
}
cmdutil.AddFormatFlag(cmd, authRefreshFields...)
feat(cli): --dry-run + risk metadata + validation parity on 19 mutations Two intertwined agent safety nets that share the same files: 1. --dry-run flag for offline preview of mutation commands 2. Risk: metadata + SetRisk helper for destructive command surfaces Coverage (19 mutation commands with --dry-run): kb.create/edit/delete agent.create/edit/delete doc.create/upload/fetch/delete doc.delete_all (special variant) session.delete chunk.delete profile.add/remove auth.refresh/logout link unlink api.{post,put,patch,delete} (api.get + --dry-run rejected, exit 2) Envelope additions (omitempty in non-dry-run paths): meta.dry_run: bool true when --dry-run was used meta.plan: map {action, args} per the per-command taxonomy Risk: metadata -------------- cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, action) stamps cobra.Annotations with risk.level=destructive + risk.action=<action> on the 9 destructive commands. The SetAgentHelp wrapper prepends a "Risk: <action> (destructive)" line in the default text help path so agents see a clear warning before parsing Usage. WEKNORA_AGENT_HELP=1 JSON path stays unchanged — structured agent-help already carries warnings[]. Validation parity with the live path ------------------------------------ Every pure-local validation (flag presence, mutual exclusion, enum bounds, URL/regex format, ResolveKBLocal for KB resolution that does not require an SDK call) runs BEFORE the dry-run gate. This matches the industry-standard "preview shows what live would do" contract: --dry-run accepts exactly the same invocations the live path accepts and rejects exactly the same invocations the live path rejects, modulo the side-effecting work itself. The side-effecting work (SDK calls, file writes, keyring writes, server- side name → id resolution) is what --dry-run actually gates. Each mutation file pairs its RunE validation block with a regression test under *_dry_run_test.go / dryrun_validation_test.go so future refactors don't reintroduce the gap. Helper surface -------------- - HandleDryRun(cmd, dryRun, plan) extracts the early-return so the 19 RunE call sites stay 3 lines each. - EmitDryRun routes through FormatOptions.Emit, inheriting _notice / TTY indent / --jq filtering for free. - ResolveKBLocal mirrors ResolveKB but never calls the SDK; dry-run paths use it so the plan reports the raw --kb value (UUID or name) without a name → id lookup. Streaming commands (chat, session ask, session continue-stream) are deliberately excluded: a buffered plan makes no sense for an event stream. Lock semantics in the dry-run path: - destructive + --dry-run: exit 0, no exit-10 confirmation prompt - --dry-run + -y: byte-identical envelope to --dry-run alone - --dry-run + --jq: filter applies to the preview envelope normally
2026-05-27 20:28:48 +00:00
cmdutil.AddDryRunFlag(cmd, &opts.DryRun)
cmdutil.SetAgentHelp(cmd, cmdutil.AgentHelp{
UsedFor: "Renew the JWT access token for the active profile (override with the global --profile) using the stored refresh token. API-key profiles are rejected.",
Output: "envelope.data has profile name that was refreshed",
})
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
return cmd
}
// defaultRefresher constructs a fresh, unauthenticated SDK client targeting
// host - the /auth/refresh endpoint reads the refresh token from the body,
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
// so no bearer / api-key header is needed.
func defaultRefresher(host string) cmdutil.Refresher {
return sdk.NewClient(host)
}
func runRefresh(ctx context.Context, opts *RefreshOptions, fopts *cmdutil.FormatOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, refresherFor func(host string) cmdutil.Refresher) error {
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
cfg, err := f.Config()
if err != nil {
return err
}
name := cfg.CurrentProfile
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
if name == "" {
return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeAuthUnauthenticated,
"no active profile configured; run `weknora auth login` to set one up")
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
}
refactor(cli): finish context→profile cascade + post-review hardening (BREAKING) Post-review polish on the v0.7 wire / surface contract. Bundles five follow-ups that landed after the main BREAKING feat commit: 1. Complete context→profile cascade (internal API + YAML schema) The prior commit renamed only the user-visible surface (commands / flags / env / project link / envelope field). The internal Go API and on-disk config schema were still half-renamed — an L-25 self-consistency violation flagged by post-merge review. Closed here: Internal Go API: - config.Context → config.Profile - config.Config.CurrentContext → CurrentProfile - config.Config.Contexts → Profiles - LoginOptions.Context → LoginOptions.Profile - clearContextSecrets() → clearProfileSecrets() - saveContextRef() → saveProfileRef() - secrets.Store: param name `context` → `profile` (interface + FileStore + KeyringStore + MemStore) - cmdutil.LoadSecret(store, context, key) → LoadSecret(store, profile, key) - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist's ctxName → profileName - Local var `ctx := &config.Profile{...}` → `prof := &config.Profile{...}` in auth/login.go to eliminate the visual collision with Go stdlib context.Context that motivated the whole rename in the first place. On-disk config.yaml schema: - current_context: → current_profile: - contexts: → profiles: - Pre-1.0 break, no compat alias. Users on v0.6 dogfooded configs must delete ~/.config/weknora/config.yaml or hand-rename the two keys (CHANGELOG migration note added). Tests / fixtures / golden files: - factory_test.go YAML fixture + assertion updated. - acceptance/e2e/e2e_test.go writeContextYAML → writeProfileYAML, fixture YAML keys updated. - acceptance/testdata/wire/doctor.error_network.json golden updated ("active context" → "active profile" in hint string). User-visible prose sweep: - cmd/mcp/serve.go --help Long: "active context (or --context)" → "active profile (or --profile)" — most-visible miss. - cmd/{kb/list, search/kb, session/list, api/api} Short/Long help. - cmd/auth/login.go stdout: `(context=%s)` → `(profile=%s)`. - cmd/auth/logout.go error: `"no current context"` → `"no current profile"`. - cmd/doctor/doctor.go hint string (also the wire golden above). - cmd/auth/refresh.go error: `"refresh token missing for context"` → `"refresh token missing for profile"`. - README.md: `## Multi-context` H2 → `## Multi-profile`; code-block comment `# current context` → `# current profile`. Code-comment / docstring sweep across cli/cmd/auth/ and cli/internal/cmdutil/. Comments referencing Go stdlib context.Context, the RAG / LLM "context window" concept, and historical CHANGELOG entries for v0.4 / v0.5 were left alone. CHANGELOG v0.7 BREAKING entry gains the on-disk-schema bullet under the existing "context → profile" item. 2. Profile name validation (shell-injection guard) `envelope.error.retry_command` is a single shell-string field. An AI agent that exec()s it via `sh -c <retry_command>` was injectable through a maliciously-named profile: weknora auth logout --name 'x; rm -rf ~' # would produce: retry_command = "weknora auth logout --name x; rm -rf ~ -y" `cmd/profile/add.go` already enforced an alphanumeric + `-_.` allowlist via `validateName`. The `auth login` and `auth logout` paths bypassed it. - Moved validation from `cmd/profile/add.go` to `cli/internal/cmdutil/profilename.go` as exported `ValidateProfileName` (cmdutil is the import-cycle-safe home; internal/config can't depend on cmdutil). - `auth login` runs the validator before any persist call. - `auth logout` runs the validator on `opts.Name` before constructing `retry_command`. - Unit tests (`profilename_test.go`) cover the allowlist, empty rejection, path-traversal, shell metacharacters (`;`, `&`, `|`, `$()`, backticks, quotes, whitespace, glob, redirects), and the user-facing hint text. The shell-metachar test exists as a regression guard. Wire shape (`retry_command` string → `retry_command_argv []string`) remains a v0.8 additive change per ROADMAP — this fix removes the practical exploit path without touching the wire contract. 3. AI-agent terminology disambiguation "agent" has three referents in this codebase: (a) WeKnora's server-side Custom Agent resource, (b) the removed `agent invoke` verb, (c) external LLM/automation consumers. Per project memory feedback_no_meta_disambiguation_in_docs, the fix is full-term naming, not "X has N meanings" prose. Surgical changes at section headers + ambiguous prose: - AGENTS.md: "Agent decision shortcuts" → "AI agent decision shortcuts"; "agent-callable surface" → "AI-agent-callable surface". - README.md: "Designed to be agent-first" → "AI-agent-first"; "Other agent ergonomics" → "Other AI-agent ergonomics"; "in agent contexts" → "in AI-agent contexts"; "for CI / agents" → "for CI / AI agents". Anaphoric "agents" inside paragraphs that already established "AI agents" was left alone — full substitution everywhere would have been prose noise without clarity gain. 4. Wire-contract review follow-ups Real findings from a second-pass review of the v0.7 envelope / streaming / surface design. Per project memory feedback_check_in_domain_anchor_first, candidate findings were first verified against the in-domain peer CLI explicitly cited as the envelope anchor; two earlier-flagged issues turned out to be in-pattern and were withdrawn. Surviving fixes: - AGENTS.md success-envelope example rewritten. The prior example showed `has_more: false` / `_notice: {}` as if they were always present, but both fields are `omitempty` and never serialize when zero / nil. Replaced with three realistic shapes (list / single resource / mutation with no payload) and added a note that optional fields are omitted when empty. - cmd/chat/chat.go Args: MinimumNArgs(1) → ExactArgs(1). v0.6 silently joined `weknora chat hello world` into `"hello world"`. v0.7 now rejects multi-arg with exit 2, matching `weknora session ask`. BREAKING; CHANGELOG entry added under v0.7 BREAKING. - internal/output/envelope.go extracts NewEnvelope(data, meta, profile) constructor. The jq-filter path in cmdutil.FormatOptions.Emit was manually rebuilding the envelope literal alongside the canonical WriteEnvelope path — drift risk when fields are added. Single construction point now. - internal/cmdutil/factory.go adds AddKBFlag(cmd) helper. Five files (chat, doc/list, doc/upload, doc/create, doc/fetch) had verbatim-identical `cmd.Flags().String("kb", ...)` declarations. Centralised so flag name + help text stay in sync with Factory.ResolveKB. Docstring reordering + gofmt fixup landed in the same edit to keep ResolveKB's own godoc attached to its function. 5. OSS-readiness comment / doc sweep Pre-publication scrub of code, comments, and shipped Markdown to remove references that only make sense in the development repo: - AGENTS.md "Deliberate deviations + mainstream alignments" section: removed peer-project name-drops from the comparison table; rewrote as five flagged design decisions with rationale but no specific competitor named. The four rows that previously contrasted against a named peer CLI now state WeKnora's choice + rationale directly. Section header renamed to "Design decisions worth flagging" since it is no longer a deviation/alignment matrix. - CHANGELOG v0.7 BREAKING rationales: three references to a named peer CLI removed; the context→profile rationale now cites only mainstream multi-credential CLIs by category (AWS / Stripe / OpenAI / Anthropic), and the `api -d/--data` removal rationale cites only `gh api` / `curl`. `chat` BREAKING entry rationale similarly simplified. - 35 cross-references to design-spec section numbers (§4.1 / §4.5 / §5.3 etc.) removed from Go doc comments and test comments across 13 files. The referenced spec lives outside the shipped tree; readers of the public repo cannot resolve them. Each reference replaced with a self-contained semantic description (e.g. "the batch envelope" / "AGENTS.md section on the success path"). - Mixed-language strings translated to English: - Four Go comments: internal/cmdutil/exit.go:213,215, internal/cmdutil/errors.go:156, internal/output/batch_test.go:90, internal/output/envelope_test.go:27. - One CHANGELOG section title: `v0.7 — Agent-first wire contract + 命令面集中清理` → `... + command-surface cleanup`. - CJK test fixtures (internal/text/truncate_test.go CJK truncation cases, cmd/session/list_test.go Chinese session title, acceptance/e2e/e2e_test.go Chinese RAG corpus) retained — they are intentional test inputs, not stray prose. - Makefile help comment: `golangci-lint added in PR-9` → `golangci-lint planned`. Internal PR numbering should not surface in shipped Makefile prose. Build green, 28/28 packages, +5 new ValidateProfileName tests. go vet / gofmt / go mod verify / go mod tidy all clean. Rationale for the cascade: pre-1.0 is the cheapest moment to close L-25 self-consistency (L-26). The half-finished internal rename would have perpetuated the very `context` vs `context.Context` ambiguity that motivated v0.7's user-visible rename in the first place.
2026-05-21 15:44:16 +00:00
c, ok := cfg.Profiles[name]
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
if !ok {
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
2026-05-21 10:41:56 +00:00
return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeLocalProfileNotFound,
fmt.Sprintf("profile not found: %s", name))
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
}
if c.Host == "" {
return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeLocalConfigCorrupt,
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
2026-05-21 10:41:56 +00:00
fmt.Sprintf("profile %q has no host", name))
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
}
if c.RefreshRef == "" {
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
2026-05-21 10:41:56 +00:00
hint := "api-key profiles can't be refreshed - rotate the key in the server UI and run `weknora auth login --with-token`"
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
if c.APIKeyRef == "" {
hint = "no refresh token stored - run `weknora auth login` to authenticate"
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
}
return &cmdutil.Error{
Code: cmdutil.CodeInputInvalidArgument,
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
2026-05-21 10:41:56 +00:00
Message: fmt.Sprintf("profile %q has no refresh token", name),
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
Hint: hint,
}
}
store, err := f.Secrets()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresherFor(c.Host), name); err != nil {
return err
}
if fopts.WantsJSON() {
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
2026-05-21 10:41:56 +00:00
return fopts.Emit(iostreams.IO.Out, refreshResult{Profile: name}, nil)
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
}
refactor(cli): envelope sweep — Emit shape, batch ops, MCP StructuredContent, api flag cleanup Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract. FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta) so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope. TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard (per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum. ~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to decode the envelope wrapper. Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers: - output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*, failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives omitempty in all-fail case). - cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow + cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per- file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1 preserved via Code → ExitCode). ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action + retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit, doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} + error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as gated but they were silently executing without -y). MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult helper. weknora api cleanup: - -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input - (stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention. - HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted. - HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds → envelope.error.retry_after_seconds. - runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout. Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape. 9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/. Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
2026-05-21 10:41:56 +00:00
fmt.Fprintf(iostreams.IO.Out, "✓ Refreshed access token for profile %s\n", name)
feat(cli): auth refresh + transparent 401 retry transport Two halves of v0.3 roadmap item 3-2. (1) `weknora auth refresh` — explicit token renewal: Reads the stored refresh_token, spends it via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (OAuth refresh-token grant), and persists both new tokens. API-key contexts rejected with input.invalid_argument (no refresh semantic). NOTE: gh CLI has `gh auth refresh` but with different semantics — gh's variant is an OAuth scope expansion / re-prompt via the browser (verified against the gh manual). The two share a name but solve different problems; there's no direct gh parallel for refresh-token grant because gh's PAT/OAuth-app model doesn't expose a short-lived access_token + refresh_token pair to clients. Error mapping: - no current context → auth.unauthenticated - --name unknown → local.context_not_found - missing refresh in keyring → auth.token_expired (hint: re-login) - server Success=false → auth.token_expired - network → network.error Envelope omits the token values (would leak into agent transcripts). (2) AuthRetryTransport — transparent retry: Wraps the SDK http.Client. On a 401 from a non-/auth/* endpoint: - JWT context: read refresh token, hit /auth/refresh, persist new pair, replay original request with new bearer. - API-key context: pass through (no refresh semantic). - Non-replayable body (req.GetBody == nil): pass through. - /auth/login or /auth/refresh: pass through (no recursion). Concurrent 401s are singleflight-coalesced via sync.Mutex — 5 parallel calls trigger exactly 1 refresh. SDK additions (additive, non-breaking): - WithTransport(rt http.RoundTripper) ClientOption. - PathAuthLogin / PathAuthRefresh constants (cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry imports them so the CLI and SDK can't drift on path strings). Refactor surfaced by the post-commit reviewer round: - cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist(ctx, store, refresher, ctxName) — the load-refresh → call-SDK → persist-pair sequence was duplicated between the standalone `auth refresh` and the transport's refresh closure; collapsed to one canonical implementation. - refreshFn signature takes context.Context so Ctrl+C during a transparent refresh cancels. - AuthRetryTransport.CurrentToken() removed — never called. 8 + 8 + 8 unit tests cover happy path / refresh-fail / auth-endpoint skip / api-key passthrough / singleflight under concurrency / non- replayable-body fallback. Roadmap: 3-2.
2026-05-12 15:34:17 +00:00
return nil
}