Commit Graph

9 Commits (014f95f1394a7bfd1c7bbbdcdc19057a80dcaca5)

Author SHA1 Message Date
nullptr-error 6ccc5cedf1
feat(sandbox): add a graphical desktop to session sandboxes (#3245) 2026-09-14 20:37:37 +08:00
nullptr-error 524deeaad5
feat(sandbox): run sandboxed execs as root by default (#3067)
* feat(sandbox): run sandboxed execs as root by default

Every chat session owns its own sandbox, so the in-container account is
not a tenant boundary and root is the least surprising default for an
agent that installs packages and writes wherever it needs. Host and
cross-tenant isolation stay at the container boundary.

DefaultSandboxExecUser becomes "root" (remote_client.go) and the sandbox
image ends with USER root. The three backends keep naming the account
explicitly on every exec so the account a call lands on does not depend
on which backend a workspace selected; the adapter default, the file
operations and the artifact-directory bootstrap all follow the constant.
The template still provisions a uid 1000 "user" account for interop with
E2B/Cube tooling that addresses it by name.

Root also makes the skill-install flow's account hand-over pointless, so
it goes: verification no longer runs after a chown/chmod lock-down and a
repair round no longer reopens the tree (normalizeSkillPermissions and
reopenSkillDirForRepair are gone), and the prepare and scratch commands
stop chowning. The scratch wipe now also clears /tmp, and the cache
budget guard sizes only root's caches, since no second account can grow
one. Verification is asserted to stay on the ordinary executor (no
AsRoot, no AllowSkillsRoot) rather than on which account it ran as.

* refactor(skills): install chat-time extras into the skill's own env

PYTHONPATH / NODE_PATH pointed at a per-session overlay
(/workspace/.skill-packages/<skill>) because the skill tree was frozen
after install: root-owned, mode 555, and often built by `uv venv` with no
pip, so `pip install --target` somewhere else was the only way a chat
session could add a package.

None of that holds now. The lock-down is gone and execs run as root, so a
missing package goes straight into the skill's own environment, and the
write is already session-local: a chat sandbox is built from the config's
image and its filesystem dies with the session, so nothing reaches the
image other sessions start from. The overlay bought nothing over that
while splitting one skill's packages across two locations.

SessionSkillPackageDir goes, and applySessionPackagePath becomes
applySkillNodePath: it appends the skill's own node_modules after
whatever the caller supplied, replacing a `+=` that prepended a bare
separator once the overlay stopped seeding the variable. No PYTHONPATH is
injected at all. Python dependencies are reached through the skill's venv
interpreter, which the shell wrapper already puts first on PATH; the
overlay-era value named the venv root, which is not an importable path.
PYTHONPATH stays on the injected-name blacklist so a stored value cannot
shadow the venv.

The runtime hints and every prompt that described the overlay now name
`<skillDir>/.venv/bin/python -m pip install` and `npm install` in the
skill directory. frozenSkillTreeGuidance / isFrozenSkillVenvFailure are
renamed for what they detect now that nothing is frozen.

* docs(prompts): reserve /workspace/output for finished deliverables

/workspace/output is the one directory an artifact collector reads, so
everything written there is offered to the user as a deliverable. The
prompts described it as the place for "deliverables" or "downloadable
artifacts" without saying it is exclusively that, which reads as "the
directory you write results to" — and a model doing multi-step work has
results at every step. Drafts, intermediate renders and debug dumps land
next to the finished file and the user is handed all of them.

The four places that describe the workspace now say the same thing: the
collector reads only /workspace/output, so finished deliverables go there
and everything in progress goes anywhere else under /workspace. The
attachment block gains the matching half for the other direction —
/workspace/input holds the user's own files and is not ours to write to,
which it previously implied by calling the paths "read-only inputs" while
the tools that enforce it say so plainly.

Only the /workspace/input half is enforced (write_sandbox_file refuses
that tree). Whether a file is finished is a judgement no tool can make,
so the output half stays guidance and is stated wherever the model is
already reading about the workspace rather than in one place it might
not see.

* fix(skills): restore executable bundles and package recovery

* style(sandbox): wrap prompt text for repository lint checks

* fix(sandbox): guard recovery paths and document root execution

---------

Co-authored-by: hailongzhao <hailongzhao@tencent.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
2026-09-07 13:03:35 +08:00
wizardchen 56d3086da1 fix(sandbox): grant appuser the docker.sock group inside the app container
The app drops to appuser via gosu, so compose group_add never reaches the
process. Matching the socket GID before the drop lets a mounted Engine API
socket work without chmod 666 on the host.
2026-09-01 17:03:40 +08:00
lyingbug 02269bd8f1
feat: require opt-in for the Docker sandbox backend (#2936)
* feat: require opt-in for the Docker sandbox backend

Docker engine access is host-root equivalent, so keep the backend off
until System Settings or WEKNORA_SANDBOX_DOCKER_ENABLED says otherwise.
Also move system-settings help into the title icon and add i18n for
tenant.auto_accept_invitation.

* fix(i18n): drop tenant wording from Docker host-risk copy

The workspace terminology check rejects 租户 / tenant in user-facing strings.
2026-09-01 15:42:28 +08:00
wizardchen f9a20b6bff feat(snapshot): introduce planned name for skill snapshots to identify abandoned builds
Added a new column `planned_name` to the `tenant_skill_snapshots` table to store the intended name of a snapshot before the provider call. This allows for the identification and reclamation of abandoned builds that may have left unreferenced snapshots due to process failures. Updated related functions to utilize this new field for better snapshot management and cleanup.
2026-08-26 16:56:26 +08:00
wizardchen ee9cf749f8 feat(sandbox): install skills on the Docker backend
Docker already ran session sandboxes, but skill install required snapshots
that only Cube and E2B advertised. Commit local skill images, boot sessions
from them, and show the skills step for Docker configs.
2026-08-26 16:56:26 +08:00
wizardchen adcb9fc10d fix(sandbox): 产物目录 bootstrap 降权,堵住 chown 跟随符号链接的容器内提权
会话级容器让「产物目录 bootstrap 以 root 执行」变成一条可复现的提权链:
沙箱账号拥有 /workspace,可以把产物目录换成指向 /etc 的符号链接;下一次
执行时 root 跑的 chown/chmod 会跟随链接,把 /etc 的属主交给沙箱账号,随后
删除重建 passwd 即可让该账号在下一次 exec 时解析成 uid 0——本 PR 刚做的
shell_exec 降权和文件操作降权会一并失效。一次性 docker run --rm 下两次执行
不共享文件系统,这条链走不通。真机验证过完整链路。

修法是让 bootstrap 和其它 exec 一样以沙箱账号运行:chown 对自己刚建的目录
是 no-op,对不属于自己的目标被内核拒绝。同时把 dockerExecUser 的空值兜底
从 root 改成 DefaultSandboxExecUser,漏传账号只会失去权限而非拿到权限,
也让三个后端对「空 User」的语义一致。

顺带订正若干过强的声明:find 只对路径最后一段不跟随符号链接,中间层的链接
仍由内核展开,因此 read_sandbox_file 的「拒绝符号链接」只覆盖路径本身指向
链接的情况;对应单测原先 mock 了一个真实 find 不会产生的返回值,改为断言
它实际覆盖的场景。文件头注释仍写着文件操作走 archive 接口,也一并更新。
2026-08-24 12:22:58 +08:00
wizardchen d6ddad5430 fix(sandbox): Docker 文件操作改走沙箱账号,堵住符号链接越权并回收僵尸进程
archive 接口(CopyToContainer / CopyFromContainer / ContainerStatPath)由 daemon
执行,它忽略 exec user 一律以 root 操作,并在解析路径时跟随符号链接。而沙箱账号对
/workspace 有写权限,调用侧的路径守卫(isUnderRoot、cleanSessionInputPath)又都是
字符串前缀比较,于是 `ln -s /root /workspace/output/esc` 之后,
/workspace/output/esc/secret.txt 既能通过守卫,又会被 daemon 以 root 读出来。真机
验证过:非特权账号 cat 该路径是 Permission denied,docker cp 同一路径拿到明文。

WriteFile / ReadFile / Stat 改为以 DefaultSandboxExecUser 走 exec,能不能读写交给
内核判定,符号链接指向哪里都不再重要,也不存在「先校验后使用」之间被换掉链接的窗口
(这正是 realpath 预校验方案挡不住的)。Stat 用 find,它不跟随符号链接,因此链接如实
报告为 other 类型,read_sandbox_file 在尝试读取之前就会拒绝。两个 copy 端点从
dockerEngineAPI 接口里移除——留着未使用的入口等于把这一类问题继续敞着。

容器入口是 sleep,从不调用 wait(),后台进程活得比启动它的 exec 久就会变成没人回收的
僵尸,堆到 pids_limit 之后所有 exec 都会失败。补 HostConfig.Init 交给 tini。实测:
三个孤儿进程,不开 Init 留下三个 Z,开了之后为零。

同步订正文档与注释中过时的 root 表述:上一次提交已把 shell_exec 降权到沙箱账号,但
docs 仍写着「exec 默认以 root 运行」「shell_exec 默认就是 root」,并据此把活跃标记可被
无限刷新归因于「容器内 root 信任边界」——标记是 chmod 666,普通技能脚本就能刷新。
2026-08-24 12:22:58 +08:00
wizardchen 9c5c52f0a4 feat(sandbox): Docker 后端支持会话级长驻容器与远程守护进程
将 Docker 沙箱后端从一次性 exec 容器改为会话级长驻容器,使其会话与文件
系统语义与 E2B / Cube 后端对齐:

- 新增 docker_engine / docker_remote_client / docker_rpc_timeout,直连
  Docker Engine API,支持 TCP+TLS 远程守护进程,并为拉镜像等慢操作单独
  设置超时;daemon 地址留空时跟随本机 docker context。
- 新增空闲清理器 docker_idle_sweeper,按 exec 刷新的活跃标记回收长驻
  容器;标记文件对沙箱非 root 账号可写。
- 会话容器补 PID1 以回收僵尸进程;标准镜像补入 curl。
- 镜像即模板:docker_template_catalog 只上报可识别的沙箱镜像,标准模板
  的拉取在后台进行并报告 building。
- 设置页与租户配置支持守护进程地址、TLS 与 CPU/内存限额,四种语言文案
  同步;沙箱健康检查覆盖 Docker 后端。
- 补充 docs/sandbox-docker-backend.md 与 POC,说明能力边界与快照语义;
  git 钩子的变更包检测跳过嵌套 module,避免拿 POC 的包去跑主 module 测试。
2026-08-24 12:22:58 +08:00