Commit Graph

7 Commits (014f95f1394a7bfd1c7bbbdcdc19057a80dcaca5)

Author SHA1 Message Date
lyingbug b82fd6c0f9
fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings (#3416)
* fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings

Verified and fixed from the shared-space permission review:

- Embed channels kept knowledge_ids, tag_ids, mentioned_items, skill_names
  and summary_model_id from anonymous visitors. Mentions are only scoped
  for shared agents, so a visitor could query any KB (and pick any model)
  of the channel workspace by ID. The payload now drops them; the widget
  never sends them.
- PUT /knowledgebase/:kb_id/wiki/issues/:issue_id/status updated any issue
  by ID. The update is now scoped to the path's KB (404 otherwise).
- A direct org invite let the inviter attach any user of the target
  workspace (or any user by ID) as its representative, whose username and
  email the roster then showed to all members. Direct adds attach no
  representative, and the roster returns emails only for the caller's own
  workspace.
- COS and KS3 dropped the bucket (and COS the region) segment when turning
  a path into an object key, while the tenant check scans every segment:
  cos://42/<region>/prefix/7/... passed as tenant 42 and read tenant 7's
  object from a shared bucket. Both must now match the service's config.
- Shared agent listings returned the full agent to receivers. Prompts and
  the creator's user ID are withheld; capabilities and scope stay visible.
- Temporary document uploads let the caller pick the parser engine (and
  its credentials) of a shared agent's workspace; only the agent's rules
  choose one there now.
- Suggested questions used request / message-snapshot knowledge_ids
  without a permission check. Each document is now resolved to its KB and
  checked like KB IDs, including a shared agent's scope.
- IM channels accepted any knowledge_base_id (and any agent ID on create).
  Both must belong to the channel's workspace, the KB also to a restricted
  API key's allow-list.
- KB-restricted API keys could list org-shared KBs outside their allow-list
  in the organization views; those listings are now filtered.
- With enable_rbac=false, RequireKBAccess let cross-workspace denials
  through. That switch is for roles inside a workspace; the guard now
  always denies another workspace's KB, since handlers behind it load by
  ID without a tenant filter.
- The org member limit was counted before and enforced apart from the
  insert; it is now checked in the insert's transaction with the
  organization row locked (SQLite serializes writers instead).
- The UpdateOrganization route comment and API doc said owner-only; the
  service and UI allow org admins. Comment and doc corrected.

Documented, not changed: issued /r/ and presigned links stay valid until
they expire after a share is revoked.

* fix(security): address review of the low-severity shared-space fixes

- Embed payloads also drop question_origin. It selects a KB like an
  @mention for agents that retrieve only when mentioned, and the widget
  never sends it; the selection stays inside the agent's scope, but an
  anonymous visitor should not pick among its KBs. suggestion_attribution is
  kept (the widget sends it and it is validated).
- The receiver view of a shared agent also withholds the follow-up
  suggestion instruction, a prompt like the others. Starter questions are
  shown to receivers anyway, and the sharer's name is displayed by design.
- Follow-up suggestion generation moves into the agent's workspace with
  types.WithExecutionTenant instead of a bare tenant rewrite, so the
  caller is pinned before the document permission check runs. The auth
  middleware and the shared run already pinned it; this removes the
  dependency on that.
- KS3 CopyFile copies only from the service's own bucket (as COS and S3
  do); another bucket's path is a cross-backend copy.

Tests cover the dropped question_origin, the follow-up instruction and the
/shared-agents listing, a follow-up context with the tenant switched, a
repeated wiki issue status update, and the KS3 copy source.
2026-09-18 22:58:46 +08:00
lyingbug db8e7611be
fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces (#3408)
* fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces

A review of how shared-space (organization) members reach each other's
resources found six paths that bypass the org-share permission model:

- presigned-preview signed any resource handle or storage path, turning a
  known resource:// handle into an anonymous /r/ URL that outlives share
  revocation. It now requires the path to belong to the caller's tenant,
  like /files.
- POST /initialization/initialize let a shared-KB editor rewrite the owner
  workspace's models (base URL, API key) in place. Only the KB's own
  workspace may call it, and rewriting a stored model needs the same
  authority as PUT /models/:id.
- KB JSON carried the legacy inline credentials (storage_config
  secret_id/secret_key, which initialization fills with the MinIO env
  keys, and vlm_config api_key) to every share receiver. They are withheld
  from JSON; their DB columns are unchanged.
- A chat without agent_source_tenant_id resolved shares before the
  caller's own agent, so a member sharing a same-ID built-in agent took
  over other workspaces' default agent. Own agents now win, built-in
  agents can no longer be shared (existing such shares no longer resolve),
  and embed channels drop a visitor-supplied source workspace.
- Any org-admin tenant (even a tenant Viewer inside it) could raise another
  workspace's KB share to editor/admin, and the route guard was bypassable
  via an unrelated :id. Share management is now: the sharer from the source
  tenant (Contributor+), source-tenant Admin+, or an org-admin tenant's
  Admin+ that may only remove or lower. share_id must belong to :id.
- Wiki write tools were registered for every wiki KB in the search targets,
  which only need read access, so a viewer share (e.g. via the built-in
  wiki fixer) could edit or delete another workspace's wiki pages. They now
  act only on KBs the caller may edit.

* fix(security): close the KB settings path and owner details for share receivers

Follow-up to the shared-space review:

- PUT /initialization/config shares the route guard that admits share
  editors, so an editor could still rebind the owner's KB models, chunking
  and storage, and storage backends resolved against the caller's workspace
  let it bind the owner's KB to its own backend. Another workspace now needs
  an admin share (the only share level the frontend offers settings to) and
  may not change the storage binding at all.
- GET /initialization/config showed model base URLs and bucket locations to
  any admin of the caller's own workspace, including share receivers. They
  now only see whether credentials are configured.
- Wiki write tools on the caller's own KBs had no role floor, so a tenant
  Viewer (and the IM, embed and MCP endpoint principals that run as Viewer)
  could write through an agent what the HTTP routes deny. Writes now need
  Contributor+, or the ingest capability for a scoped API key, following
  the RBAC rollout switch.
- resolveAgent logs the share lookup error instead of a nil own-agent error
  when a shared selector fails.

* fix(security): close the medium shared-space access findings

Follow-up to the high-risk fixes, from the same review:

- Wiki fixer moved into a shared KB's workspace ran with the caller's own
  config there: an unset MCP mode registered all of the owner's MCP
  services, and an "all" KB scope reached the owner's other KBs. The scoped
  run now uses the built-in config pinned to that one KB, without MCP,
  skills, sandbox or web search, and falls back to the KB's own model.
- An unset MCP mode means "all" at runtime but is shown as none in the share
  scope; shared runs now treat it as none.
- Quick-answer mode used the request's web_search_enabled alone, so a
  receiver could turn on search the agent disables and spend the owner's
  provider quota. It now requires the agent setting too, as agent mode does.
- summary_model_id picked any model of the workspace a run executes in. It
  is ignored for shared agents and the relocated wiki fixer.
- A workspace that left or was removed from an organization kept sharing its
  KBs and agents. Its shares are revoked on departure, and share queries and
  permission checks require the source workspace's membership and a live
  organization, which also covers rows left behind earlier.
- Sharing an agent exposes its KB scope to all members, so a Contributor
  could share colleagues' KBs (or "all") through an agent. The sharer must
  now be able to share each KB directly (creator or Admin+; "all" needs
  Admin+), also when a shared agent's scope is widened later.
- A scoped API key with manage_channels could mint an MCP endpoint token
  wider than itself. Endpoints it creates, updates or rotates must stay
  within its KB allow-list and capabilities.
- A shared agent's run indexed the receiver's Q&A into the owner's chat
  history KB; indexing now uses the session owner's configuration.
- Sharing an agent with skills keeps injecting the owner's skill
  environment values (product decision); the share panel now warns that
  members can read them. Preview of originals through read-only shares is
  kept as designed and documented.
2026-09-18 22:00:02 +08:00
lyingbug 6db8fdd601
feat(artifacts): artifacts library page backed by a message_artifacts table (#3384)
* feat(artifacts): add an artifacts library with its own message_artifacts table

Skill-generated files were only reachable from inside the conversation that
produced them. This adds a sidebar entry and a page that lists them across
every conversation the user can see.

Storage: artifacts move out of the messages.artifacts JSONB column into a new
message_artifacts table (PostgreSQL 000103, SQLite 000023), backfilled on
upgrade. The table is now the only source of truth; the old column is kept and
the down migration writes the table back into it. The message repository
loads artifacts for every message it returns and writes them on create,
update (when non-nil) and fork, so callers still use Message.Artifacts.
mod_time is stored as RFC 3339 text because the collector matches files on
nanosecond mtimes, which PostgreSQL timestamps would truncate.

API: GET /api/v1/artifacts lists the latest version of each file (grouped by
session + source path, with version_count), scoped like the session list,
with keyword / file type filters and paging. Downloads keep using the
per-session endpoint.

Frontend: "产物/Artifacts" sidebar entry (hidden without sandbox support), a
library page with type tabs, search, date groups, infinite loading, preview
drawer, download and jump-to-conversation; strings in all five locales. The
sidebar's top-menu paths are now one shared list.

* fix(artifacts): keep the restore hash guard and count versions by URL

RecordRestoredArtifactMtime again only stamps rows whose content hash matches
the restored content (and ignores empty hashes), and never rewrites the hash,
matching MessageArtifacts.WithRestoredMtime. Without the guard a restore of
v1's content also moved v2's mtime and relabelled v2 with v1's hash.

The library's version_count now counts distinct URLs per (session, source
path). A later answer that references an earlier file stores another row with
the same URL, which COUNT(*) reported as an extra version.

* fix(artifacts): scope the library to web chats and clear the legacy column

The library used the session list's default scope, which counts sessions
without an owner as legacy tenant-level rows. IM sessions are created without
an owner, so every member saw the file names and titles of every IM chat
(downloads then 404 for non-admins). The library now applies the same "web"
bucket predicate as the home sidebar, extracted from QueryPaged so the two
cannot drift: no IM mapping (including cleared ones), no embed marker, no
API-key owner.

Migrations 000103 / SQLite 000023 now clear messages.artifacts after the
backfill. Message loads still SELECT *, so the stale copy was read on every
history load. Only rows that carried artifacts are rewritten; the column stays
for instances on the old binary during a rolling upgrade, and the down
migration still rebuilds it from the table.

* fix(migrations): keep the 000103 backfill alive on malformed artifact JSON

A single file_size that is not an integer ("12.5", "") or a created_at that
does not parse ("garbage", month 13) raised a cast error and failed the whole
migration, blocking startup. Casts now go through pg_temp helpers that return
NULL on bad input, falling back to 0 and the message's created_at; valid rows
are unchanged. SQLite casts never raise; its migration test now covers the
same malformed values.

* docs(artifacts): describe the web-only library scope and the cleared legacy column
2026-09-18 12:10:19 +08:00
lyingbug ef9cbf456d
docs: update website guides and improve writing style (#3095)
* docs: sync website guides with current product capabilities

* docs: improve website guide structure and writing style
2026-09-08 10:54:41 +08:00
wizardchen f780f81fc0 docs(website-docs): add comprehensive product documentation site
Import and update WeKnora documentation with VitePress: getting started,
architecture, features, API reference, clients, and development guides.
Includes landing page with inline SVG illustrations, theme components,
doc check scripts, and product screenshots.
2026-08-06 19:54:40 +08:00
lyingbug 8d9309e8fc Revert "docs: add comprehensive WeKnora documentation"
This reverts commit 4aeef20b46.
2026-08-06 19:52:25 +08:00
wizardchen 4aeef20b46 docs: add comprehensive WeKnora documentation
This commit introduces a complete set of documentation for WeKnora, organized into six main sections: Getting Started, Architecture, Features, API Reference, Clients, and Development Guide. Key highlights include:

- Detailed installation instructions and quick start guides.
- In-depth architectural overview and backend design documentation.
- Comprehensive feature descriptions, including multi-tenant support, document parsing, and agent capabilities.
- API reference covering approximately 360 endpoints with usage examples.
- Client documentation for various interfaces including web, CLI, and SDK.

This documentation aims to facilitate user onboarding and provide a thorough understanding of the WeKnora system.
2026-08-06 18:29:35 +08:00