Commit Graph

2 Commits (22cbcdfa5789b33dbb8d47532c21b24da2fdf5aa)

Author SHA1 Message Date
lyingbug db8e7611be
fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces (#3408)
* fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces

A review of how shared-space (organization) members reach each other's
resources found six paths that bypass the org-share permission model:

- presigned-preview signed any resource handle or storage path, turning a
  known resource:// handle into an anonymous /r/ URL that outlives share
  revocation. It now requires the path to belong to the caller's tenant,
  like /files.
- POST /initialization/initialize let a shared-KB editor rewrite the owner
  workspace's models (base URL, API key) in place. Only the KB's own
  workspace may call it, and rewriting a stored model needs the same
  authority as PUT /models/:id.
- KB JSON carried the legacy inline credentials (storage_config
  secret_id/secret_key, which initialization fills with the MinIO env
  keys, and vlm_config api_key) to every share receiver. They are withheld
  from JSON; their DB columns are unchanged.
- A chat without agent_source_tenant_id resolved shares before the
  caller's own agent, so a member sharing a same-ID built-in agent took
  over other workspaces' default agent. Own agents now win, built-in
  agents can no longer be shared (existing such shares no longer resolve),
  and embed channels drop a visitor-supplied source workspace.
- Any org-admin tenant (even a tenant Viewer inside it) could raise another
  workspace's KB share to editor/admin, and the route guard was bypassable
  via an unrelated :id. Share management is now: the sharer from the source
  tenant (Contributor+), source-tenant Admin+, or an org-admin tenant's
  Admin+ that may only remove or lower. share_id must belong to :id.
- Wiki write tools were registered for every wiki KB in the search targets,
  which only need read access, so a viewer share (e.g. via the built-in
  wiki fixer) could edit or delete another workspace's wiki pages. They now
  act only on KBs the caller may edit.

* fix(security): close the KB settings path and owner details for share receivers

Follow-up to the shared-space review:

- PUT /initialization/config shares the route guard that admits share
  editors, so an editor could still rebind the owner's KB models, chunking
  and storage, and storage backends resolved against the caller's workspace
  let it bind the owner's KB to its own backend. Another workspace now needs
  an admin share (the only share level the frontend offers settings to) and
  may not change the storage binding at all.
- GET /initialization/config showed model base URLs and bucket locations to
  any admin of the caller's own workspace, including share receivers. They
  now only see whether credentials are configured.
- Wiki write tools on the caller's own KBs had no role floor, so a tenant
  Viewer (and the IM, embed and MCP endpoint principals that run as Viewer)
  could write through an agent what the HTTP routes deny. Writes now need
  Contributor+, or the ingest capability for a scoped API key, following
  the RBAC rollout switch.
- resolveAgent logs the share lookup error instead of a nil own-agent error
  when a shared selector fails.

* fix(security): close the medium shared-space access findings

Follow-up to the high-risk fixes, from the same review:

- Wiki fixer moved into a shared KB's workspace ran with the caller's own
  config there: an unset MCP mode registered all of the owner's MCP
  services, and an "all" KB scope reached the owner's other KBs. The scoped
  run now uses the built-in config pinned to that one KB, without MCP,
  skills, sandbox or web search, and falls back to the KB's own model.
- An unset MCP mode means "all" at runtime but is shown as none in the share
  scope; shared runs now treat it as none.
- Quick-answer mode used the request's web_search_enabled alone, so a
  receiver could turn on search the agent disables and spend the owner's
  provider quota. It now requires the agent setting too, as agent mode does.
- summary_model_id picked any model of the workspace a run executes in. It
  is ignored for shared agents and the relocated wiki fixer.
- A workspace that left or was removed from an organization kept sharing its
  KBs and agents. Its shares are revoked on departure, and share queries and
  permission checks require the source workspace's membership and a live
  organization, which also covers rows left behind earlier.
- Sharing an agent exposes its KB scope to all members, so a Contributor
  could share colleagues' KBs (or "all") through an agent. The sharer must
  now be able to share each KB directly (creator or Admin+; "all" needs
  Admin+), also when a shared agent's scope is widened later.
- A scoped API key with manage_channels could mint an MCP endpoint token
  wider than itself. Endpoints it creates, updates or rotates must stay
  within its KB allow-list and capabilities.
- A shared agent's run indexed the receiver's Q&A into the owner's chat
  history KB; indexing now uses the session owner's configuration.
- Sharing an agent with skills keeps injecting the owner's skill
  environment values (product decision); the share panel now warns that
  members can read them. Preview of originals through read-only shares is
  kept as designed and documented.
2026-09-18 22:00:02 +08:00
wizardchen fc64751f4e fix(security): close init config and parser-check redaction gaps
Strip model base URLs from viewer-accessible initialization config
responses and merge redacted parser secrets before engine check overrides
so admin test flows keep working after masked GET responses.
2026-07-02 14:41:42 +08:00