Commit Graph

5 Commits (de2dfd3034a7b506fa269910401bbdcbd4efc71d)

Author SHA1 Message Date
Leo Dawn 56d075e213
fix(sandbox): resolve a session's pinned sandbox in the workspace that owns it (#3471)
* fix(sandbox): resolve a session's pinned sandbox in the workspace that owns it

tenant_sandbox_configs is keyed by (tenant_id, id), so a config id is not an
address on its own. sessions.sandbox_config_id stored only the id and every
reader took the workspace from the ambient request context.

That holds inside a chat turn, which already runs under the agent's workspace
(WithExecutionTenant in the QA handler). It breaks for a shared agent
everywhere else, because a shared agent runs on ITS OWNER's sandbox config
while the session belongs to the borrower, and these paths run from plain
requests whose only tenant is the session owner's:

  * DeleteSession resolved nothing and returned after a warning. Cube and E2B
    create session sandboxes with onTimeout=pause, so the MicroVM was not
    reclaimed later either: it stayed paused, billing, with nobody holding its
    id. ReapOrphanSandboxes has no production caller, so nothing recovered it.
  * The terminal and desktop panels failed on both branches - attaching to the
    pinned sandbox and provisioning a new one - with ErrSandboxConfigNotFound,
    which terminalErrorFrame maps to a bare INTERNAL close reason. The panel is
    offered unconditionally and already forwards agent_source_tenant_id, so
    this was a dead end the user could reach in one click.
  * Fork read the pin through PinnedSessionSandbox, got no manager, and
    silently degraded to SNAPSHOT_UNSUPPORTED, losing the sandbox state.
  * The fork snapshot lease recorded the session's workspace next to the
    lending workspace's config id, so the reaper could not resolve it either.

Record the owning workspace beside the pin and make the pair travel together
as SandboxPin. Readers now take the workspace from the pin and fall back to the
session's own, which is what every non-borrowed pin (and every row written
before this column) resolves to - so behaviour for own agents is unchanged.

The provision path has no pin yet, so the WebSocket handler passes the agent's
workspace along with its config: terminalProvisionPin already resolved the
shared agent, it just discarded the tenant resolveAgent handed back.

Backfill in the migration is limited to sessions whose pinned config does not
exist in their own workspace - the only ones that can have borrowed it - using
the lending workspace recorded on their newest shared-agent message. Lite has
no shared spaces, so the SQLite mirror adds the column without a backfill.

* fix(sandbox): backfill the pin owner from the config row and self-heal legacy pins

Three gaps in the session sandbox pin owner:

Backfilling from messages.agent_tenant_id names the wrong workspace. The
pin is sticky to the session's FIRST sandbox, while the newest message
carrying agent_tenant_id may belong to a later shared agent from another
workspace. Writing that tenant leaves teardown resolving a config the
workspace does not own - the very failure the column exists to fix.
tenant_sandbox_configs.id is a global UUID primary key, so joining the
config row itself names the workspace that actually owns the pin.

The column was INTEGER while every other tenant id is BIGINT/uint64.
Postgres INTEGER is 32-bit signed, so a large tenant id would not fit.

Rows the SQL backfill cannot reach keep sandbox_config_tenant_id = 0
forever: the reader falls back to the caller's workspace but never
records what it learned. The next chat turn already runs under the
workspace that can resolve the config, so persisting it there is what
lets a later DELETE, panel open or fork find the sandbox. recordOwner
only writes when the lookup actually succeeded and the stored owner is
still unset - stamping the caller's tenant onto a failed lookup would
brand a sticky pin left by a previous shared agent with the wrong
workspace.

Also renames the lentSandboxConfg typo and corrects the fork degrade
reason in a comment: a lent config that resolves to nil fails
BoundSandboxID, so the fork degrades to SANDBOX_GONE, not
SNAPSHOT_UNSUPPORTED.

* fix(sandbox): require a named backend before recording a pin's owner

The self-heal wants to persist an owner "that actually resolved this config",
but a nil error does not prove that. resolveTenantSandboxForConfig returns a
disabled manager with no error twice before it ever reads the config row: for
the workspace kill switch, and for an empty or deployment-default config id.

That reopens the leak this column exists to close. The SQL backfill correctly
leaves sandbox_config_tenant_id at 0 whenever the pinned config belongs to the
session's own workspace, which is most existing rows. One turn of a shared
agent lent by a workspace whose admin has script execution turned off then
short-circuits on the kill switch, returns nil, and stamps that lending
workspace onto a config it does not own. The next DELETE resolves the pin there,
finds nothing, and strands the paused MicroVM.

The pin branch runs before agentConfigID is read, so the shared agent does not
even need a sandbox config of its own to trigger it.

A named backend (Cube/E2B/Docker) is the proof, and it is the same condition
that is already allowed to CREATE a pin further down: what may write a pin may
update whose it is. A config that exists but resolves to type "disabled" is
skipped as well - ownership is genuine there, but such a config never creates a
sandbox, so no teardown can go missing.

The deployment-default pin was inert either way (both workspaces short-circuit
to a manager with no DestroySession), but it is covered too so a later
relaxation of the proof cannot quietly reopen the kill-switch case.

Both tests fail without the guard.

---------

Co-authored-by: hailongzhao <hailongzhao@tencent.com>
2026-09-21 15:38:39 +08:00
lyingbug db8e7611be
fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces (#3408)
* fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces

A review of how shared-space (organization) members reach each other's
resources found six paths that bypass the org-share permission model:

- presigned-preview signed any resource handle or storage path, turning a
  known resource:// handle into an anonymous /r/ URL that outlives share
  revocation. It now requires the path to belong to the caller's tenant,
  like /files.
- POST /initialization/initialize let a shared-KB editor rewrite the owner
  workspace's models (base URL, API key) in place. Only the KB's own
  workspace may call it, and rewriting a stored model needs the same
  authority as PUT /models/:id.
- KB JSON carried the legacy inline credentials (storage_config
  secret_id/secret_key, which initialization fills with the MinIO env
  keys, and vlm_config api_key) to every share receiver. They are withheld
  from JSON; their DB columns are unchanged.
- A chat without agent_source_tenant_id resolved shares before the
  caller's own agent, so a member sharing a same-ID built-in agent took
  over other workspaces' default agent. Own agents now win, built-in
  agents can no longer be shared (existing such shares no longer resolve),
  and embed channels drop a visitor-supplied source workspace.
- Any org-admin tenant (even a tenant Viewer inside it) could raise another
  workspace's KB share to editor/admin, and the route guard was bypassable
  via an unrelated :id. Share management is now: the sharer from the source
  tenant (Contributor+), source-tenant Admin+, or an org-admin tenant's
  Admin+ that may only remove or lower. share_id must belong to :id.
- Wiki write tools were registered for every wiki KB in the search targets,
  which only need read access, so a viewer share (e.g. via the built-in
  wiki fixer) could edit or delete another workspace's wiki pages. They now
  act only on KBs the caller may edit.

* fix(security): close the KB settings path and owner details for share receivers

Follow-up to the shared-space review:

- PUT /initialization/config shares the route guard that admits share
  editors, so an editor could still rebind the owner's KB models, chunking
  and storage, and storage backends resolved against the caller's workspace
  let it bind the owner's KB to its own backend. Another workspace now needs
  an admin share (the only share level the frontend offers settings to) and
  may not change the storage binding at all.
- GET /initialization/config showed model base URLs and bucket locations to
  any admin of the caller's own workspace, including share receivers. They
  now only see whether credentials are configured.
- Wiki write tools on the caller's own KBs had no role floor, so a tenant
  Viewer (and the IM, embed and MCP endpoint principals that run as Viewer)
  could write through an agent what the HTTP routes deny. Writes now need
  Contributor+, or the ingest capability for a scoped API key, following
  the RBAC rollout switch.
- resolveAgent logs the share lookup error instead of a nil own-agent error
  when a shared selector fails.

* fix(security): close the medium shared-space access findings

Follow-up to the high-risk fixes, from the same review:

- Wiki fixer moved into a shared KB's workspace ran with the caller's own
  config there: an unset MCP mode registered all of the owner's MCP
  services, and an "all" KB scope reached the owner's other KBs. The scoped
  run now uses the built-in config pinned to that one KB, without MCP,
  skills, sandbox or web search, and falls back to the KB's own model.
- An unset MCP mode means "all" at runtime but is shown as none in the share
  scope; shared runs now treat it as none.
- Quick-answer mode used the request's web_search_enabled alone, so a
  receiver could turn on search the agent disables and spend the owner's
  provider quota. It now requires the agent setting too, as agent mode does.
- summary_model_id picked any model of the workspace a run executes in. It
  is ignored for shared agents and the relocated wiki fixer.
- A workspace that left or was removed from an organization kept sharing its
  KBs and agents. Its shares are revoked on departure, and share queries and
  permission checks require the source workspace's membership and a live
  organization, which also covers rows left behind earlier.
- Sharing an agent exposes its KB scope to all members, so a Contributor
  could share colleagues' KBs (or "all") through an agent. The sharer must
  now be able to share each KB directly (creator or Admin+; "all" needs
  Admin+), also when a shared agent's scope is widened later.
- A scoped API key with manage_channels could mint an MCP endpoint token
  wider than itself. Endpoints it creates, updates or rotates must stay
  within its KB allow-list and capabilities.
- A shared agent's run indexed the receiver's Q&A into the owner's chat
  history KB; indexing now uses the session owner's configuration.
- Sharing an agent with skills keeps injecting the owner's skill
  environment values (product decision); the share panel now warns that
  members can read them. Preview of originals through read-only shares is
  kept as designed and documented.
2026-09-18 22:00:02 +08:00
VictorMaznyuk b94612a7ec
fix(agent): PUT no longer erases the avatar, and driver errors stay server-side (#3230)
* fix(agent): PUT no longer erases the avatar, and driver errors stay server-side

Two defects in the custom-agent API, both of which surface as a successful or
misleading response.

1. A config-only PUT wiped the avatar.

   UpdateAgentRequest.Avatar was a plain string, so "field omitted" and
   "explicit clear" were indistinguishable, and UpdateAgent assigned it
   unconditionally. Any caller that updated only the config — which is what
   an edit form or an SDK client does when it sends the config it changed —
   silently zeroed the avatar and still received 200.

   Avatar now travels as *string end to end: nil keeps the stored value, a
   pointer to "" is an explicit clear. The service takes it as a separate
   argument because *types.CustomAgent cannot express the difference.

2. Raw repository/driver errors reached the client.

   The fallback branches forwarded err.Error() verbatim, so a postgres
   message — for example "ERROR: value too long for type character
   varying(64) (SQLSTATE 22001)" — was returned in the API response. That
   leaks schema details and tells the caller nothing actionable. Each
   fallback now returns a fixed message naming the operation; the full error
   is still logged immediately above, so nothing is lost for diagnosis.

   The same oversized-avatar case is now rejected earlier, by ValidateAvatar,
   as a 400 that names the varchar(64) limit instead of a 500 produced by the
   database.

Typed sentinels and *errors.AppError keep their existing behaviour — only the
untyped fallbacks changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(agent): complete avatar preservation and regression coverage

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
2026-09-14 20:50:15 +08:00
nullptr-error 277d6ee851
feat(sandbox): add an interactive terminal and files tab beside chat (#3110)
* feat(sandbox): stream interactive PTYs from Cube and E2B

Give session sandboxes a provider-neutral terminal capability so a later
WebSocket layer can attach without knowing Cube vs E2B. Long-lived
streams use a timeout-free client; idle terminals keep the sandbox alive
by refreshing TTL, and a workspace can set how long to wait before
disconnect.

* feat(session): bridge browser terminals to the session sandbox

Mint a short-lived ticket over a normal authenticated POST so the browser
WebSocket never puts the access JWT in the query string. After upgrade,
recheck the bound token, membership, and session ownership so logout or
revocation tears the PTY down. Provisioning stays opt-in: a GET
handshake only creates a sandbox when the client sends provision=1.

* feat(chat): add a sandbox terminal panel beside the conversation

Open a side panel with an xterm attached to the session sandbox. Starting
the terminal is an explicit click so merely opening the panel does not
create or resume a microVM; reconnects stay lookup-only until the user
confirms create-and-start. Persist the remote shell PID in
sessionStorage so a refresh reattaches instead of spawning an orphan.

* feat(sandbox): let workspaces set terminal idle disconnect

Expose the idle-disconnect duration in the sandbox config editor so an
operator can close unused terminals and let the provider TTL pause the
sandbox, instead of leaving PTYs open for the built-in 15 minutes.

* feat(chat): show generated files in the sandbox side panel

Move the per-message artifact list into the first tab of the right-hand panel so generated files stay in view with the terminal. Keep the old drawer only for embedded chat.

* fix(sandbox-terminal): keep tickets out of logs and live PTYs across refresh

Gin was copying the handshake JWT into response_body logs, silent access-token
rotation dropped open terminals as AUTH_REVOKED, and first-use provisioning
missed shared agents. Local echo now skips password prompts.

---------

Co-authored-by: hailongzhao <hailongzhao@tencent.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
2026-09-08 17:43:15 +08:00
wizardchen cc846d8e29 fix: harden shared agent source selector validation
Reject invalid agent_source_tenant_id instead of silently falling back, fix a resolveAgent nil panic when a shared selector fails, and add regression tests for wiki write-tool filtering and agent resolution.
2026-07-30 12:28:23 +08:00