Commit Graph

5 Commits (eb888d0d3dfe44e2fd9547f6cf930e6a8bdb28fd)

Author SHA1 Message Date
Captain 171097f06e
feat(security): add a whitelist-only outbound mode that refuses before DNS (#3393)
* feat(security): add a whitelist-only outbound mode that refuses before DNS

A penetration test of a private deployment found that a host outside
SSRF_WHITELIST still produces a DNS query: every outbound guard resolves
the name first and judges the addresses afterwards, which is what makes
it immune to DNS rebinding, but it also means an attacker-chosen name
reaches the resolver and can carry data out of an otherwise offline
network (#3378).

SSRF_DNS_WHITELIST_ONLY makes the whitelist the whole egress policy, and
the check is placed wherever a name is still in hand.

Where a URL is available, CheckSSRFWhitelistOnly refuses a host the
whitelist does not name, IP literals included: URL validation, the
sandbox outbound policy, and the web-fetch target resolver.

Where only a dial address is available, CheckDialWhitelistOnly judges
hostnames and leaves addresses to the checks that already exist, because
an IP arriving at a dialer is either a name something else resolved or a
literal the URL layer already refused. That covers the shared SSRF-safe
dialer, the web-fetch dialer, the Yunzhijia webhook dialer, and every
sandbox transport: the HTTP and websocket data planes, the guarded
transport and the Docker engine now share one GuardedDialContext instead
of each building its own dialer.

Where the client resolves its own target, the name is judged before the
client exists. gRPC's resolver runs before any dialer it was given, so
the env-configured qdrant and milvus clients are built through small
constructors that refuse a non-whitelisted host outright; a whitelisted
one is resolved by gRPC as before.

docreader enforces the same switch in its own validator, and compose
passes the variable to both services.

Matching is by name only in this mode: the whitelist's CIDR entries
still match an IP literal, but a hostname is no longer resolved to see
whether its addresses fall inside one, because that lookup is the query
the mode exists to prevent.

The value is parsed with ParseBool, and a non-empty value that parses as
neither enables the mode: silently leaving an egress lockdown off
because an operator wrote "yes" is the one failure mode a security
control must not have.

Still not covered, and documented as such: the Langfuse OTLP exporter
builds its own client and never reaches these guards; and with
HTTP(S)_PROXY set the proxy host is dialled unguarded when the dial
address equals the proxy URL's host exactly, while a mismatch makes the
proxy host itself subject to the whitelist.

The switch defaults to off, so nothing changes for deployments that do
not set it.

* docs(security): document SSRF_DNS_WHITELIST_ONLY in website-docs

docs/ has been retired in favour of website-docs/ (#3580), so the notes that
lived in docs/QA.md move to the configuration table: the new switch, what to
whitelist before turning it on, and the three outbound paths it still does
not cover.

The existing SSRF_WHITELIST row was also stale: compose gives only the app its
SSRF_WHITELIST_EXTRA default (which now includes minio), and docreader's is
empty, so "shared by app and docreader" held for SSRF_WHITELIST alone.
2026-09-23 12:02:06 +08:00
lyingbug d7ccd5ba51
fix: align client sessions and integration request handling (#3305)
* fix: align client sessions and integration request handling

* fix: preserve trusted Doris redirects and prepare browser tests

* fix: align proxy address checks and integration test coverage
2026-09-16 16:20:57 +08:00
wizardchen ff818b681f fix: share IP classification between SSRF and sandbox URL guards
Keep one classifier for address kinds so user-fetch SSRF and sandbox
control-plane checks cannot disagree, and refuse IPv6 encodings that
embed link-local or other never-routable targets.
2026-09-01 15:35:14 +08:00
lyingbug 1030832c4b
fix(security): harden outbound URL SSRF protection (#2626)
* fix(security): harden outbound URL SSRF protection

* test(security): add SSRF validation tests for outbound URL caching

Introduce tests for outbound SSRF validation cache to ensure proper handling of URL validation, including cache reuse for the same origin, cache invalidation on whitelist changes, and expiration of cached entries. This enhances the robustness of SSRF protection mechanisms in the application.

* refactor: clean up whitespace in engine_factory.go and ssrf_outbound_cache.go

Removed unnecessary blank lines in engine_factory.go and adjusted variable declarations for consistency in ssrf_outbound_cache.go. This improves code readability without altering functionality.
2026-08-10 13:24:14 +08:00
wizardchen 1d322c525a fix(security): block SSRF via redirects in knowledge URL import
Use the SSRF-safe HTTP client for file_url downloads and add redirect-aware
guards to the docreader Playwright path, closing GHSA-44fp, GHSA-rv6v, and
GHSA-c7m6.
2026-07-02 12:27:48 +08:00