docs: correct why older builds opened
The commit before this one claimed releases that opened fine "were ad-hoc signed, predating the config entry". They were not: every DMG this channel has published, back to the first 0.1.0, carries Authority=Shift Local Signing, because Tauri selects a keychain identity itself when signingIdentity is unset. What survives is the verified part — a self-signed identity that cannot chain to a trusted root elsewhere, and an ad-hoc binary that gets an approvable prompt instead of a hard refusal — so the build change stands and only the archaeology is corrected.main
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@ -81,14 +81,23 @@ machine says depends on how the binary is signed:
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| Self-signed certificate | "cannot be opened because it is damaged" / reported as malware, with **only 移至废纸篓** — no override, no pane entry to approve |
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| Developer ID + notarized | Opens on double-click, no prompt |
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The middle row is the trap that cost a release. Signing with a locally created
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certificate ("Shift Local Signing") *looks* better — `codesign` on the build machine reports
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`valid on disk` and `satisfies its Designated Requirement`, and `spctl` even accepts it — but
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the certificate lives only in that one Mac's keychain, is self-issued, and is `CA:FALSE`, so
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on any other machine it cannot chain to a trusted root. Sequoia turns an unchainable
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signature on a quarantined download into a hard refusal, which is strictly worse than no
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certificate at all. If the identity is used again it must be installed **and trusted** on
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every machine, which is not something to ask of a user.
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The middle row is what a release shipped with, and it is a trap because it looks healthy
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locally: `codesign` reports `valid on disk` and `satisfies its Designated Requirement`, and
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`spctl` accepts it on the build host. The certificate ("Shift Local Signing") is self-issued,
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`CA:FALSE`, and present in only that one Mac's keychain, so on any other machine it cannot
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chain to a trusted root — and an unchainable signature on a quarantined download is a hard
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refusal rather than a prompt.
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One correction worth keeping, because the obvious story is wrong: every DMG this channel has
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ever published carries that same `Authority=Shift Local Signing`, including the earliest 0.1.0
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ones, because Tauri picks a keychain identity itself when `signingIdentity` is unset. So
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"older builds were ad-hoc" is **not** why one machine accepted them — a machine that had been
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shown the app before may already trust the certificate, and Gatekeeper's own heuristics have
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changed across macOS versions. What is verified is the direction of the fix: an ad-hoc binary
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is reported as an unidentified developer with a way through, which is the behaviour this
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project wants, and no release is worse off for losing a certificate no other Mac can check.
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Reusing that identity again would mean installing it **and trusting it** on every machine,
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which is not something to ask of a user.
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So: ad-hoc, and the two containers each cover one job.
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