docs: correct why older builds opened

The commit before this one claimed releases that opened fine "were ad-hoc signed,
predating the config entry". They were not: every DMG this channel has published,
back to the first 0.1.0, carries Authority=Shift Local Signing, because Tauri selects
a keychain identity itself when signingIdentity is unset.

What survives is the verified part — a self-signed identity that cannot chain to a
trusted root elsewhere, and an ad-hoc binary that gets an approvable prompt instead of
a hard refusal — so the build change stands and only the archaeology is corrected.
main
mula.liu 2026-10-26 09:48:18 +08:00
parent 42d6424e9f
commit 4ed236bd9e
1 changed files with 17 additions and 8 deletions

View File

@ -81,14 +81,23 @@ machine says depends on how the binary is signed:
| Self-signed certificate | "cannot be opened because it is damaged" / reported as malware, with **only 移至废纸篓** — no override, no pane entry to approve |
| Developer ID + notarized | Opens on double-click, no prompt |
The middle row is the trap that cost a release. Signing with a locally created
certificate ("Shift Local Signing") *looks* better — `codesign` on the build machine reports
`valid on disk` and `satisfies its Designated Requirement`, and `spctl` even accepts it — but
the certificate lives only in that one Mac's keychain, is self-issued, and is `CA:FALSE`, so
on any other machine it cannot chain to a trusted root. Sequoia turns an unchainable
signature on a quarantined download into a hard refusal, which is strictly worse than no
certificate at all. If the identity is used again it must be installed **and trusted** on
every machine, which is not something to ask of a user.
The middle row is what a release shipped with, and it is a trap because it looks healthy
locally: `codesign` reports `valid on disk` and `satisfies its Designated Requirement`, and
`spctl` accepts it on the build host. The certificate ("Shift Local Signing") is self-issued,
`CA:FALSE`, and present in only that one Mac's keychain, so on any other machine it cannot
chain to a trusted root — and an unchainable signature on a quarantined download is a hard
refusal rather than a prompt.
One correction worth keeping, because the obvious story is wrong: every DMG this channel has
ever published carries that same `Authority=Shift Local Signing`, including the earliest 0.1.0
ones, because Tauri picks a keychain identity itself when `signingIdentity` is unset. So
"older builds were ad-hoc" is **not** why one machine accepted them — a machine that had been
shown the app before may already trust the certificate, and Gatekeeper's own heuristics have
changed across macOS versions. What is verified is the direction of the fix: an ad-hoc binary
is reported as an unidentified developer with a way through, which is the behaviour this
project wants, and no release is worse off for losing a certificate no other Mac can check.
Reusing that identity again would mean installing it **and trusting it** on every machine,
which is not something to ask of a user.
So: ad-hoc, and the two containers each cover one job.