diff --git a/docs/RELEASE.md b/docs/RELEASE.md index 660dd3a..0ace71f 100644 --- a/docs/RELEASE.md +++ b/docs/RELEASE.md @@ -81,14 +81,23 @@ machine says depends on how the binary is signed: | Self-signed certificate | "cannot be opened because it is damaged" / reported as malware, with **only 移至废纸篓** — no override, no pane entry to approve | | Developer ID + notarized | Opens on double-click, no prompt | -The middle row is the trap that cost a release. Signing with a locally created -certificate ("Shift Local Signing") *looks* better — `codesign` on the build machine reports -`valid on disk` and `satisfies its Designated Requirement`, and `spctl` even accepts it — but -the certificate lives only in that one Mac's keychain, is self-issued, and is `CA:FALSE`, so -on any other machine it cannot chain to a trusted root. Sequoia turns an unchainable -signature on a quarantined download into a hard refusal, which is strictly worse than no -certificate at all. If the identity is used again it must be installed **and trusted** on -every machine, which is not something to ask of a user. +The middle row is what a release shipped with, and it is a trap because it looks healthy +locally: `codesign` reports `valid on disk` and `satisfies its Designated Requirement`, and +`spctl` accepts it on the build host. The certificate ("Shift Local Signing") is self-issued, +`CA:FALSE`, and present in only that one Mac's keychain, so on any other machine it cannot +chain to a trusted root — and an unchainable signature on a quarantined download is a hard +refusal rather than a prompt. + +One correction worth keeping, because the obvious story is wrong: every DMG this channel has +ever published carries that same `Authority=Shift Local Signing`, including the earliest 0.1.0 +ones, because Tauri picks a keychain identity itself when `signingIdentity` is unset. So +"older builds were ad-hoc" is **not** why one machine accepted them — a machine that had been +shown the app before may already trust the certificate, and Gatekeeper's own heuristics have +changed across macOS versions. What is verified is the direction of the fix: an ad-hoc binary +is reported as an unidentified developer with a way through, which is the behaviour this +project wants, and no release is worse off for losing a certificate no other Mac can check. +Reusing that identity again would mean installing it **and trusting it** on every machine, +which is not something to ask of a user. So: ad-hoc, and the two containers each cover one job.