194 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
194 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
# Security model
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Shift is a local desktop utility that opens files the user chooses, invokes
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native renderers and external tools, listens for local-network transfers, and
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installs signed or hash-verified updates. This document states what is
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protected, how, and what remains outside the current guarantee.
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It is a design document, not a promise that every path has received an
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independent audit.
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## Assets
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- The user's source files and output folders.
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- The integrity of the installed application and its update channel.
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- The user's consent before another machine writes a file.
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- Local data such as `settings.json` and `history.json`.
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- Release-signing and manifest-signing secrets.
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## Threat model
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Relevant adversaries include:
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- a malicious or malformed image, document, PDF or media file;
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- a machine on the same LAN that sends beacons, opens transfer sockets or
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impersonates another Shift;
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- a compromised update feed, release branch or HTTP endpoint;
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- an attacker who can modify files in the user's temp or config directories;
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- a compromised renderer or injected content in the bundled webview.
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The model does not assume the local operating-system account is already
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compromised. An attacker with the user's account can generally read and modify
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the same files Shift can.
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## Local file access and webview
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Shift's own React bundle calls Tauri commands with paths selected by the user or
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returned by Shift. There is no user-authored HTML or remote page loaded into the
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main window. External files are treated as data, not executable content.
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The Tauri configuration currently sets `csp: null` and gives the asset protocol
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scope `**`. That is intentionally broad because the editor and previews need
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local files and the canvas needs same-origin image data. If renderer-content
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injection is ever found, those settings increase the impact: the injected script
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could call available commands or read local assets. Hardening this would require
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a tested CSP/asset-scope reduction and a full editor, OCR-worker and clipboard
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smoke test; until then, treat the webview bundle as part of the trusted computing
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base.
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The app does not ship a remote-content loader, analytics SDK or advertising
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component.
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## Untrusted files and resource exhaustion
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File extensions decide the conversion catalogue, but not trust. Document and
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media parsers receive attacker-controlled bytes.
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Implemented bounds:
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- editor text preview: 8 MiB before reading;
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- editor image input: 64 MiB before reading, plus a 40-megapixel decode limit
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where the decoder can report dimensions before full decode;
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- editor data URL: 128 MiB, with a second decoded-size and pixel check;
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- pinned-image preview: 40 megapixels;
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- update manifest: 256 KiB after download;
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- update artifact: exact declared size and SHA256, rechecked before install;
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- LAN peer table: 256 entries;
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- LAN transfer: the receiver reads exactly the header-declared byte count and
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removes a partial temp file on failure;
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- GIF conversion: time, frame-rate, width and byte ceiling;
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- PDF page extraction: per-page extracted-text limit and bounded render edge.
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Not yet uniformly bounded:
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- Office ZIP entries and XML can still expand under decoder defaults; there is
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no one shared decompressed-size quota across DOCX/PPTX/XLSX paths.
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- PDF rendering and compression rely partly on external renderers (PDFKit,
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Poppler, ImageMagick, FFmpeg) with their own limits.
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- CSV/TSV and some Office paths read whole files or sheets into memory.
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- LAN transfers have no maximum file size or free-space preflight. The receiver
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sees the declared size before accepting, but a malicious peer can still
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occupy disk after consent.
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- A manifest download is size-checked after it has been written, not while it is
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streaming.
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Do not open adversarial documents in production until these paths have explicit
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quotas and tests. Report a reproducible resource-exhaustion case rather than
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assuming the editor limits cover every converter.
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## Update trust boundary
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The update channel is a git branch containing `shift-update.json`, optional
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`shift-update.sig`, and installer files. Builds derive the feed URL from the git
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remote or from `SHIFT_UPDATE_URL`.
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Controls:
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- manifest `schema` must be exactly the supported version (currently 1);
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- artifact filenames must be safe ASCII basenames;
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- artifact size must be nonzero and SHA256 must be valid hex;
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- the manifest is capped at 256 KiB;
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- a build compiled with `SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEY` requires a detached ed25519
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signature over the manifest's exact bytes;
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- the installer is checked for exact byte length and SHA256 after download;
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- both checks run again immediately before installing;
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- the installer must be a regular file, not a symlink;
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- macOS and Windows handoff scripts receive paths as process arguments, not
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interpolated shell/batch text;
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- `Discard` deletes the downloaded artifact, not just the UI state.
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Residual risk:
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- An **unsigned** build trusts the HTTPS origin plus anyone able to write the
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release branch or its raw endpoint. SHA256 proves the file matches the
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manifest, not that the manifest is authentic.
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- A signed build trusts the baked public key and the custody of its private key.
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Leaking the key allows publishing a malicious manifest and installer.
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- The update artifacts are ad-hoc signed and not notarized on macOS. Gatekeeper
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cannot independently vouch for the publisher; the in-app hash/signature path
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is the relevant check.
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- Windows installer signing is not currently performed.
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- The download directory is under the system temp directory. Re-verification
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detects replacement before install, but local temp-directory manipulation is
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still a same-account threat.
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- Windows runs the handoff through `cmd.exe`; argument passing is covered by
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source-level checks, but every legal character in a user-profile path still
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needs real Windows validation.
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## LAN sharing
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Discovery uses UDP multicast/broadcast/unicast on `239.255.77.88:47888`.
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Transfers use a direct TCP connection advertised by the beacon.
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The SHSF protocol is **not authenticated, not encrypted and not confidential**.
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Anyone on the reachable network can:
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- observe beacon metadata such as machine name and platform;
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- send a forged offer with an arbitrary sender name and transfer id;
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- attempt connections to the receiver's TCP port.
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The consent card prevents an unsolicited transfer from being written
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automatically. It does **not** prove that the named sender is the real owner of
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that machine. Accept files only from people and networks you trust. The batch
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window means later files from the same unauthenticated batch id are accepted for
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120 seconds without another prompt.
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Implemented limits:
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- peer table capped at 256, with stale entries removed first;
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- transfer header capped at 64 KiB;
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- part files are removed after failure;
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- sender copies exactly the declared size, so extra source bytes cannot be
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mistaken for the acknowledgement;
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- receiver reports a transfer error after an accepted transfer fails.
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No protocol-level authentication, encryption, rate limiting or maximum transfer
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size is implemented. Firewall or OS network policy is the outer boundary.
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## External processes and secrets
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External tools are invoked with argument arrays through `process::command`,
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which also hides console windows on Windows. Paths are not passed through a
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shell except where a documented system command requires one; those call sites
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must be reviewed individually.
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The release private key (`.ed25519`) must remain outside the repository and
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outside build artifacts. `SHIFT_RELEASE_KEY` is for the packaging host only;
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`SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEY` is the public value intended to be baked into builds.
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Never paste a private key into an issue, log or CI variable that is visible to
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untrusted jobs.
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## Platform permissions
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- macOS Screen Recording enables capture.
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- macOS Files & Folders enables selected output directories.
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- macOS Microphone enables recording with audio.
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- macOS Local Network enables multicast discovery.
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- Windows Firewall must allow private-network traffic for discovery/receive.
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Ad-hoc macOS signing can change the code identity on rebuild, causing
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permissions to reset. A Developer ID identity would stabilize them but is not
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currently part of the release pipeline.
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## Reporting
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Report a vulnerability privately through the repository host's available
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private security channel. Include the affected version, platform, minimal
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reproduction, expected/actual behavior and whether a file, LAN peer or update
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feed is required. Do not attach a stolen signing key or a working exploit to a
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public issue.
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If no private channel is configured, contact the maintainers first and share
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only enough detail to establish a private transfer method.
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